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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the relationship between economic freedom and social capital in 
U.S. contiguous states from the 1980s to the 2000s as there is a shortcoming of literature on the 
topic. This study develops a composite social capital index that captures important aspects of 
social capital such as voter turnout, social trust, informal socialization and religious participation. 
This study finds that the changes in subnational level economic freedom measures have positive 
significant effects on social capital while the levels of economic freedom measures have no 
significant effect on social capital. Moreover, no significant link between all government level 
economic freedom measures and social capital is observed. This study also investigates the link 
between economic freedom and social trust, used as a measure of social capital in previous 
studies; no significant link between economic freedom and social trust is investigated.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000) claims that social capital has been declining over the past 
decades (since the 1970s) in the U.S. He argues that voter turnout has decreased, people have 
involved less in organizations and religious affairs, and socializing among people has declined. 
A decrease in civic engagement may affect negatively the health of a country since strong civic 
engagement is important for political, social and economic issues such as better schools, faster 
economic development, lower crime, better neighborhoods, and more effective government 
(Putnam 1995a, 2000). Moreover, Coleman (1988) and Fukuyama (1995, 2001) independently 
mention the importance of social capital and agree that the presence of social capital in society is 
beneficial to both individuals and society. Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000) identifies the factors 
affecting social capital such as education, pressures of time and money, role of women in 
modern decades, mobility, race, generation effects, change in technology, and the rise of welfare 
state. 
 Empirical studies have examined factors affecting social capital in U.S. states. For 
instances, Glaeser et al. (2002) find that age, gender, education, and home ownership are 
important factors for social capital. Rupasingha et al. (2006) find that education, female labor 
force participation, community attachment, age, income inequality, and ethnic homogeneity have 
significant effects on social capital. However, there are not a lot of studies that examine the 
effects of institutions or policies on social capital. This is a major omission as government 
involvements or policies can be influential for individuals’ decisions to engage in civic affairs. 
 How do institutions affect social capital? North (1991) states that effective institutions are 
required to reduce transaction costs, and they are beneficial to cooperative actions. He defines 
institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
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interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conducts), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (1991, p.97). Hence, 
there would be a link between economic freedom and social capital since economic freedom as 
an institution (or government policies in market activities) can provide ground for social 
interactions that produce social capital. 
 The link between economic freedom and social capital, however, is not clear since 
economic freedom may either increase or decrease social capital, or there might be no link at all 
between these two factors in a society. Referring to Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1995b) claims 
that the rise of the welfare state is one of the causes of civil disengagement as big government 
replaces private choices and undermines civil assets. Therefore, economic freedom may increase 
social capital as it demands minimum involvement of government in market activities.  Berggren 
and Jordahl (2006) hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between economic freedom 
and social capital; on the other hand, they point out that “commercialism erodes civic assets such 
as social capital” (2006, p. 142). 
 Hence, the relationship between economic freedom and social capital is unclear. A study 
by Berggren and Jordahl (2006) examining the relationship between economic freedom and 
social capital across countries, which is defined as trust in their study, is the first effort to 
investigate the link between economic freedom and social capital. Their findings show that there 
is a positive link between economic freedom and trust. Using the dynamic panel dataset of U.S. 
states, Jackson et al. (2014) examine the link between economic freedom and social capital in the 
U.S. Taking advantage of social capital index developed by Hawes et al. (2013), they find that 
there is no clear empirical link between economic freedom and social capital. However, it is 
important to notice that social capital index of Hawes et al. (2013) used in Jackson et al. (2014) 
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does not capture attitudinal aspects of social capital such as trust, which is an important aspect of 
social capital. 
 One possible answer for competing results of these two studies is the use of different 
measures of social capital – generalized trust in Berggren and Jordahl (2006), and a social capital 
index (constructed based on non-attitudinal aspects of social capital) in Jackson et al. (2014). 
Hence, it would be interesting to see what type of relationship between economic freedom and 
social capital would exist if a composite social capital index that could capture both attitudinal 
and non-attitudinal aspects of social capital is used as a measure of social capital. 
 Besides the limited number of studies for the relationship between economic freedom and 
social capital, there exists a problem in conducting empirical research related to social capital. 
Fukuyama (2001) points out that one of the weaknesses of the social capital is that there is no 
consensus among scholars in measuring social capital. The same problem exists in defining 
social capital since social capital is a multi-dimensional concept. Various measures such as trust, 
group or organizational memberships, and civic engagement are used to capture the concept of 
social capital in previous studies. Hence, to capture important aspects of social capital mentioned 
in previous social capital literature, a composite social capital index of U.S contiguous states is 
developed in this study. Using the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index of North America, 
this study is able to estimate the link between Economic freedom and social capital across U.S. 
contiguous states over three decades – from the 1980s to the 2000s. Besides, by estimating the 
link between economic freedom and trust, this study hopes to serve as a bridge between the two 
previous studies – Berggren and Jordahl (2006), and Jackson et al. (2014). 
 The contributions of this study to existing social capital and economic freedom literature 
is threefold. First, this study develops a composite social capital index of U.S. contiguous states. 
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Second, this study estimates possible links between economic freedom and social capital in the 
U.S. to examine whether economic institutions or government policies affect social capital 
(2014). Third, the relationship between economic freedom and trust is also examined to compare 
with the findings of Berggren and Jordahl (2006). Moreover, this study also estimates the links 
between the areas of economic freedom and social capital (and trust as well) since the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom index of North America is made up of three distinct areas – size of 
government, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor market freedom. 
 This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces social capital while section 3 
presents the process of developing a social capital index. Section 4 gives information about 
economic freedom, and section 5 details possible links between economic freedom and social 
capital. Data and empirical approach, and results are discussed in sections 6 and 7 respectively. 
Finally, section 8 concludes with the findings and discussions. 
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2. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 The weakness of concept of social capital is that there is no consensus among scholars in 
defining and measuring social capital since it is a multi-dimensional concept. It is reasonable to 
assume that each component (or aspect) of social capital can be implied as social capital based 
on circumstances; on the other hand, all aspects of social capital can also form to establish a 
definition or concept of social capital. In addition, the problem with social capital is not just in 
defining and measuring, also it is debatable to analogize social capital to physical capital. 
Therefore, in this section, the definitions and concepts of social capital by various scholars from 
different fields – economics, political science and sociology – are discussed. 
2.1. Definitions of Social Capital 
 Putnam (2000) states that the term “social capital” had been created at least six times in 
the twentieth century. According to him, L.J. Hanifan, a state supervisor of rural schools in West 
Virginia, is the first person who used the term “social capital”. Hanifan used the term “social 
capital” in 1916 to stress how community involvement was crucial for success of schools. 
Hanifan refers to social capital as “those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily 
lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the 
individuals and families who make up a social unit…” (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Hanifan’s idea of 
social capital was not noticed by other social commentators at his time but scholars in different 
fields of studies - Canadian sociologists in the 1950s, urbanist Jane Jacobs in the 1960s, 
economist Glenn Loury in the 1970s, and social theorist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1980s - has 
explored the idea of social capital independently during the twentieth century (Putnam 2000). 
 Sobel (2002) surveys the literature of social capital, and he offers the definition of social 
capital by Bourdieu (1986) as follow: “Social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social 
 6 
context. One can acquire social capital through purposeful actions and can transform social 
capital into conventional economic gains. The ability to do so, however, depends on the nature of 
the social obligations, connections, and networks available to you.” Bourdieu (1986) discusses 
how profits accrued from social capital can be different according to the size and nature of social 
networks or connections that an individual has. Individuals can sometimes be benefited from 
social capital through unconscious pursuit of social capital. For instance, living in a 
neighborhood where social capital is abundant such as higher stock or level of trust among 
people in the neighborhood. 
 Sociologist James S. Coleman (1988, p.S98) states “… social capital is defined by its 
function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – 
whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure…” According to Coleman (1988), 
accumulating of social capital is within the structures such as ties through family, community 
and religious affiliation. He describes how social ties can facilitate transactions among 
individuals living in a society where social capital is abundant. 
 Putnam (1995, p.67) defines social capital as “features to social organization such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordinating and cooperation for mutual benefit.” 
Later in his book “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community”, Putnam 
(2000, p.19) describes social capital as “…connections among individuals – social networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. Hence, social capital can be 
described as social interactions among individuals, and trust and norms of reciprocity are built 
through the interactions that later channel mutual benefits (either economic or non-economic 
gains) for individuals. 
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 According to Fukuyama (2001, p.7), “Social capital is an instantiated informal norm that 
promotes co-operation between two or more individuals.” He states that instantiated informal 
norms are in a wide range - as simple as reciprocity between two friends and as complex as the 
formally built system of practices or beliefs such as religions. Only when individuals start 
interacting, the norm of reciprocity comes into realization. Otherwise, the norm of reciprocity is 
never practiced even though it may exist. He argues that “trust, networks, civil society, and the 
like, which have been associated with social capital, are all epiphenomenal, arising as a result of 
social capital but not constituting social capital itself”. Referring to his point of view, social 
capital causes trust, networks, civil society, and the like forms in social context. 
 In Woolcock’s words, social capital is described as “the information, trust, and norms of 
reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks” (1998, p.153). Newton (1997, p.575) defines 
social capital in three dimensions “… (a) norms and values, (b) networks, or (c) consequences – 
voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources”, where he means norms as trust. He 
states that trust is important for a society to deal with social and political stability. The lack of 
trust leads a society to chaos. Stiglitz (1999) defines social capital in four aspects – tacit 
knowledge, a collection of networks, reputation and organizational perspectives; the presence of 
social capital helps individual cope with moral hazard and incentive problems existing in market 
activities. 
 Glaeser et al. describe social capital of an individual as “… a person’s social 
characteristics – including social skills, charisma, and the size of his Rolodex…” (2002, p. 
F438). Hence, in the modern world of advanced technology in communication, one may measure 
social capital of a person by the contact lists in his mobile phone, and numbers of friends or 
followers in his social media accounts such as twitter, facebook or etc. Sobel (2002), drawing on 
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the compiled works of previous social capital scholars, considers social capital as circumstances 
where individuals obtain benefits through joining groups and networks. From the view of Paxton 
(1999, 2002), individuals accumulate social capital through a network of ties (associational ties) 
where trust, reciprocity and optimism among individuals are necessary. When social capital is 
acquired, it makes it easier for production of goods at different levels – individual, group and 
community. Robinson, Schmid and Siles (2002) define social capital as sympathy among 
individuals or groups. The existence of sympathy among groups or individuals may lead to 
create beneficial treatments or circumstances for groups and individuals. 
 Based on the definitions and concepts of social capital by scholars, social capital, in 
general, can be described as an intangible asset accumulated through social interactions among 
individuals, and the accumulated social capital later benefits both individuals and society. Trust, 
reciprocity, sympathy, norms, connections and the like are created through social interactions. 
Each of these factors (formed as a result of social interactions) can be assumed as a form (or an 
aspect) of social capital or these entities altogether can form social capital. 
2.2. Channeling Social Capital through Social Interactions 
 Social interactions are important as they are sources of social capital. Without social 
interactions, it is not possible to build trust, norms, networks and etc. When individuals interact, 
the building of trust, norms, reciprocity, sympathy and such attitudinal aspects in social context 
among individuals is processed. The process of building such things can take shorter or longer 
based on size, characteristics, historical and cultural background of a society. Importantly, 
frequency of interactions among individuals may account for accumulation of social capital. The 
process may take shorter if individuals interact more frequently. When individuals interact quite 
often, it would take shorter time for them to know and learn about each other. Consequently, 
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frequent interaction leads to accumulate trust, reciprocity or other attitudinal aspects of social 
capital among individuals faster. Frequency of social interactions may depend on culture of a 
society. For instance, people living in a religious society are likely to go to church on every 
Sunday (or their particular religious institutions frequently); in such society, frequency of social 
interaction is high as participation in religious events involves interactions among individuals. 
Stiglitz (1999) once mentions that history plays important role in promoting social capital. 
Hence, societies where people actively involves in social affairs historically witness frequent 
interactions of individuals, and social capital in such societies might be relatively higher as 
socializing could be a tradition or custom of such societies. 
 Glaeser et al. (2002) find that accumulation of social capital is contingent on individuals’ 
investment decisions, and individuals accumulate their social capital when their incentives for 
joining groups or participating in social activities are high. A utility maximizing individual 
invests when he sees profitable returns. When returns are not feasible, people will stop investing. 
Considering social capital as both investment and consumption goods, people invest time and 
money in social capital accumulating process, which could range from informal socializing to 
joining a formal organization. Returns from social capital can exist in different forms. For 
instance, it could be satisfaction that an individual gains through informal socializing activities 
such as socializing with friends or economic outcomes such as gaining information about job 
opportunities (or even getting a job) through joining formal social networks. 
 It might be possible to assume that frequent interaction may also lead individuals not to 
accumulate social capital when benefits are not feasible in the short term. Suppose that 
individuals care about only particular short-term benefits (or do not see any short-term benefits) 
through being members of organizations or networks, then they are likely to quickly quit being 
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members of such groups. For instance, a person may join a professional organization to get 
information about more career opportunities to advance his career so he frequently involves in 
activities such as attending weekly meetings. If he does not obtain any resourceful information 
about career or job opportunities, assumed as particular short-term benefits, in a short term (let’s 
say a month or may be two), then he may assume or realize that being in a such organization 
would be a waste of time. Then, he is likely to quit being a member or going to weekly meetings 
as the more he involves, the quicker he can realize the pros and cons of being involved in social 
organizations. Hence, frequent interactions can be quite influential to individuals’ social capital 
investment decisions. 
2.3. Capital Aspects of Social Capital 
 Does social capital have properties of capital? Does it differ from the other types of 
capitals such as physical capital and human capital? Arrow (1999) and Solow (1999) in Social 
Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, edited by Dasgupta and Serageldin, published by the World 
Bank, independently criticize that social capital lacks particular properties that define something 
as “capital”. According to Arrow (1999, p. 4), “ the term “capital” implies three aspects: (a) 
extension in time; (b) deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefit; and (c) alienability.” 
Arrow (1999) argues that social capital completely lacks the second aspect of capital; individuals 
may not join the networks or associations for explicit economic gains (calculated benefits) such 
as getting a job through the networks of friends but for other reasons, and hence, individuals 
need not make material sacrifice for future calculated benefits. Moreover, individuals cannot 
transfer or sell social capital to each other. Physical capital such as a computer can be transferred 
among individuals via the market but social capital lacks such aspect of capital. 
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 Solow (1999) criticizes that the term “social capital” is not an appropriate term since it 
lacks the particular aspect of capital such as a rate of return in comparison with physical capital. 
Solow (1999, p.7) states that “any stock of capital is a cumulation of past flows of investment, 
with past flows of depreciation netted out.” Solow (1999) points out that social capital lacks that 
aspect of capital. According to him, stock of social capital is vaguely measurable, and “behavior 
patterns” might be more appropriate term instead of social capital. 
 Coleman (1988) first claims the like of social capital in comparison to the other types of 
capitals such as physical and human capital. According to him, social capital, like the other types 
of capital, is created through changes. Physical capital is created by the changes in materials, and 
human capital is created by the changes in individuals’ knowledge and abilities. Like these types 
of capitals, social capital is also created by the process of changes in the relations among 
individuals. A computer, as an example of physical capital, is made through transformations of 
different raw hardware and transformed materials come together as a final product called a 
computer. Knowledge and capabilities of individuals is accumulated through the process of 
learning, and later accumulated capabilities come as human capital. Relationships among 
individuals are changed through time; as individuals interact more and more, the relationships 
among individuals become closer and lead to the formation of social capital. 
 Moreover, Coleman (1988) argues how social capital is useful for production just like 
physical and human capital. He states that social capital facilitates production easier just like 
physical and human capital – “for example, a group within which there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group 
without that trustworthiness and trust” (1988, p.S101). Putnam (2000) compares the notions of 
social capital with physical and human capitals. According to him, as physical capital (tools) and 
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human capital (education) are required for production and increase productivity in both 
individual and collective actions, social capital (social contacts among individuals) can increase 
productivity as well. 
 Sobel (2002) points out that the efforts of Coleman (1988), Glaeser et al. (2002), and 
Stiglitz (1999) are not convincible enough to analogize social capital to physical capital. 
However, scholars mention that research on social capital should not be ignored even though 
social capital is a controversial concept in term of its analogy to physical capital. Sobel (2002) 
offers the conclusion of Dasgupta (1999, p. 398) in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective as 
follows: “social capital is useful insofar as it draws our attention to those particular institutions 
serving economic life that might otherwise go unnoted”. Even though Solow (1999, p.6) is 
critical of the term “social capital”, he cautions that not to imply his critics on ideas of social 
capital as “the underlying ideas are unimportant or irrelevant to economic performance.” Hence, 
research on social capital are crucial to political, social and economic issues; its impacts on 
society should not be ignored just because of its controversial nature. 
2.4. What is Social Capital Good for? 
 Scholars have mentioned that positive effects of social capital on broad categories of 
social and economic issues. Coleman (1988), Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000), and Fukuyama 
(1995, 2001) independently discuss the importance of social capital, and how its presence in 
society is beneficial to both individuals and society. Coleman (1988) shows how social capital, 
existing both within and outside of family, can reduce high school dropout rates. Putnam (2000) 
argues that quality of education, neighborhoods, economy, democracy, happiness and health are 
contingent on social capital. 
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 Jackson et al. (2014) discuss several functions of social capital. Social capital reduces 
transaction cost; such kind of function is called the “grease” function. The wholesale diamond 
market operated by Jewish community in Brooklyn, New York is a great example of such 
function, offered by Coleman (1988), to illustrate how social capital can help reduce transaction 
cost in market activities. Jewish are most likely to marry within their own community and live in 
the same neighborhood. The whole diamond market operated by Jewish is within the closed-knit 
community. During the process of negotiating a diamond sale, a bag of diamonds, the subject of 
a sale, will be handed over from a merchant to another merchant to examine the quality of 
diamonds in his private time. Since the community is small, defecting the game (such as stealing 
diamonds or replacing with other nonprecious stones) by the merchant who is in possession of 
diamonds to examine is impossible; even if he attempts to defect the game, punishment is likely 
to be bigger than the value of diamonds he would steal as he is likely to be punished in terms of 
family, community and business ties. 
 Hence, agents in this particular example, Jewish diamond merchants, are least likely to 
defect the game (the process of negotiating diamond sale) easily. What facilitates the process of 
wholesale diamond sale in Jewish community is social capital – strong relationships and 
networks in the community; and social capital serves as an informal institution in Jewish 
community. Since the defecting the game in this particular example is least likely to happen, it 
builds trust among the agents, and trust is accumulated over time. Existence of trustworthiness in 
the community can facilitate not only the sale process of diamonds but also on other social and 
business occasions. Hence, strong relationships, networks and trustworthiness serve as grease to 
reduce transaction costs in market activities. 
 14 
 Another example of social capital’s grease function is that social capital serves as 
information channel for individuals (Coleman 1988). A person can gather required information 
through interaction with friends or colleagues who share same interest; such social interactions 
can bring up-to-date news or developments of one’s particular field or interest without gathering 
all the available information by oneself. Moreover, a person who belongs to professional 
organizations can obtain useful information about job opportunities easily as mentioned 
previously; he or she can reduce amount of time to look for better job opportunities or 
professional development through networks and affiliations. Hence, such social interactions and 
affiliations can reduce transaction cost – information cost in this example – for individuals. 
 Another function of social capital is called “glue” function that can hold societies 
together (Jackson et al. 2014). Putnam (2000) mentions that social capital can “bridge” diverse 
societies; with presence of abundant social capital, different networks or societies can access 
external resources and information. On the other hand, social capital can “bond” homogenous 
groups – not limited to ethnicity but applied to all sorts of different groups based on 
demographics, interests or hobbies. Bonding function among the homogenous ethnic group can 
provide social and physiological support to less fortunate members of the society. Besides grease 
and glue functions of social capital, social capital (in terms of relationships, sympathy, empathy 
and the like) is a consumption good for human beings. Relationships with others can fulfill social 
needs of human beings since physiological needs alone do not fulfill healthy lives for 
humankind. Moreover, social capital can serve as a part of protection against bad forms of 
authorities (Jackson et al. 2014). 
 Empirical studies show the positive effect of social capital on economic growth or 
development, for instances, Knack and Keefer (1997); Whiteley (2000); Helliwell and Putnam 
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(1995); Knack and Zak (2003); and Bjørnskov (2012). The positive impact of social capital is not 
just on growth, but also on other areas, such as the quality of government (Knack 2002), 
financial development (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2000), democracy (Paxton 2002), and 
knowledge creation (McFadyen and Cannella 2004). Increase in social capital can also reduce 
homicide (Rosenfeld, Messner and Baumer 2001). These aforementioned studies are just some 
selected examples that show impacts of social capital on socio-economic issues. 
 Even though studies show that social capital is good for society, its externalities can be 
both positive and negative depending on the types of social capital. Putnam (2000) mentions the 
dark side of social capital such as social capital in terrorist or extremist groups. Strong existence 
of social capital in such groups such as ties among its members affect negatively on society. An 
extremist group is likely to grow animosity against the rest of society, and it will lead violence 
and chaos to society when the group becomes more powerful. Just as a good combination of 
human capital, physical capital and social capital can prosper society, a bad combination of those 
capitals - a nuclear scientist (human capital) from a terrorist group (social capital) possessing raw 
materials for nuclear weapons (physical capital) - is destructive to society. 
2.5. What Affects Social Capital? 
 Studies have examined the factors affecting social capital. Glaeser et al. (2002) study the 
formation of social capital in the U.S. by analyzing individual investment to accumulate social 
capital. Using responses to organization membership questions from the General Social Survey 
(GSS) as social capital variable, their findings show that individuals aged between 30 and 50 are 
more likely to join groups or organizations than the others. In addition, they find that females are 
less likely to join groups than males. Their findings show that both education and home 
ownership are statistically significantly positive for almost all types of memberships. 
 16 
 Rupasingha et al. (2006) identify factors which matter production of social capital at the 
level of U.S. counties. They present the production function for social capital using associational 
activity and other indicators of social capital such as the percentage of voters during presidential 
elections. They find that education, female labor participation, community attachment, age, and 
families and children are significantly positive to the producing of social capital. Among these 
variables, they conclude that education is the single most important determinant of social capital. 
Homeownership and ethnic heterogeneity have negative and significant effect on social capital. 
Even though the impact of income inequality is negative, it is not very significant. 
 Knack and Zak (2003) shows the factors that affect trust through the components such as 
formal institutions, inequality, and social distance. They find that education, income distribution, 
and communication are important factors for building trust. They conclude that policies that 
influence trust levels are strengthening formal institutions by raising years in school, expanding 
civil liberties, and increasing press freedoms. Increase in education and redistributive transfers 
can reduce income inequality that eventually affect trust building process. They point out that 
trust can be directly raised through communication by increasing the number of land-based 
phones, mobile phones, paved roads and through greater civil liberties. Education is the most 
important factor that affect positively on social capital based on these studies. Intuitions can 
promote social coherency in societies, and that would later bring benefits to societies, however, 
Stiglitz (1999) mentions that institutions can be inefficient, and inefficient institutions may 
persist. Not a lot of studies, however, has examined effect of institutions on social capital, so this 
study expands the current literature on social capital by studying how economic institutions can 
affect social capital. 
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3. DEVELOPING A SOCIAL CAPITAL INDEX 
 One of the objectives of this study is to develop a social capital index that captures many 
aspects of social capital defined by Putnam (2000). Hawes et al. (2013) break down Putnam’s 
social capital definition into five categories: community and organizational life, engagement in 
public affairs, community volunteerism, informal sociability, and social trust. The first three 
categories are captured in a social capital index constructed by Hawes et al. (2013), but 
attitudinal aspects of social capital (informal sociability and social trust) are not included in their 
social capital measure. 
 To capture both attitudinal and non-attitudinal aspects of social capital, this study 
includes four measures of social capital: voter turnout, informal socialization, religious 
participation and social trust. Hawes et al. (2013) include voter turnout under the category of 
engagement in public affairs. This study, however, is not able to include community 
volunteerism as it is not possible to have any access for data related to such issue. Even though 
the data for community and organizational life is available, this study is unable to include the 
membership variable that can capture such aspect since it does not pass a threshold for arbitrary 
sample size – detail about that is discussed in subsection 3.2. The measure of social capital in 
this study, however, is able to capture most important aspects of social capital. 
3.1. Data 
 Survey responses from General Social Survey (GSS) spanning from 1972 to 2012 are 
collected to create the social capital index. National Opinion Research Center at the University 
of Chicago has conducted the GSS since 1972 to monitor the societal changes in the U.S. The 
GSS conducts personal interviews to adults (aged 18 years or older) from randomly selected 
households. The questions included in the survey are designed to capture the attitudes, behaviors 
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and attributes of individuals toward American society. Samples in the GSS are drawn from 
English speaking adults till 2004, and samples from Spanish speaking adults have been included 
after 2006. The survey has been conducted biannually since 1994, and it was conducted annually 
from 1972 to 1994 (except in 1979, 1981 and 1992). 
 One drawback of using data from the GSS is that the survey is not designed to produce 
estimates at state-level; hence, the sampling units are not states. Data for some states are 
completely unavailable in the GSS (for instance, there is no observation for Nevada and 
Nebraska). In addition, there are significantly less number of respondents for some states in a 
particular decade, and those observations are dropped to avoid inaccurate estimates. Hawes et al. 
(2013), however, point out that measures such as social trust (varies by decades) developed 
through the GSS data produce reliable estimates by referring to the works of Brace et al. (2002), 
and Uslaner and Brown (2005). Therefore, this study is able to develop the social capital index 
that varies by decades (from the 1970s to the 2000s). 
 The first category of the social capital index is voter turnout that can be used as a proxy 
to measure political participation of individuals, which falls under the category of engagement in 
public affairs in Hawes et al. (2013). The percentage of respondents that voted in presidential 
elections is used to capture voter turnout. The second category is informal socialization that 
includes socializing activities such as socializing at bar, socializing with friends who are not 
from respondents’ neighborhood, and socializing with neighbors, relatives, siblings, and parents. 
This study is not able to include socializing with siblings and parents as the components of social 
capital due to the fewer number of respondents to these items. 
 In addition, arbitration is required to make a threshold in calculating the percentage of 
respondents involving in socializing activities as socializing a few times per year does not 
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accumulate or generate social capital. This study uses socializing at least once a month as a 
threshold in calculating social capital index, and there are four items – socializing at bar, 
socializing with friends, socializing with relatives and socializing with neighbors1 - in the 
informal socializing variable. The same threshold is applied to the third category – participating 
in religious services; hence, percentage of respondents that attend religious services at least once 
a month is used to capture the religious participation. 
Table 1: Questions in the GSS related to Social Capital 
Description  Question 
1. Voter Turnout  
Did respondents vote in the presidential 
election?  
Do you remember for sure whether or not you 
voted in that election? 
2. Informal Socialization 
Spend evening at Bar Go to a bar or tavern? 
Spend evening with relatives Spend a social evening with relatives? 
Spend evening with neighbors Spend a social evening with someone who lives in 
your neighborhood? 
Spend evening with friends Spend a social evening with your friends? 
3. Religious Participation  
Attend religious services How often do you attend religious services? 
4. Social Trust  
Can people be trusted Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
Can people be trusted Do you think people can be trusted? 
 
 The final component is social trust. To calculate social trust, respondents’ answers to two 
questions that fall under the description of trustworthiness of people is used. The first question 
asks respondents whether respondents would say that most people can be trusted or that you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people. And the second questions asks respondents whether 
                                                 
1  The cumulative percentage of respondents involving in informal socializing is calculated by cumulating the 
percentage of respondents that socialize every day, once or twice a week, several times a month or once a month (at 
least). Same calculation is applied to the fourth component – religious participating. 
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respondents think people can be trusted. Based on these two questions, the percentage of 
respondents that agree that people can be trusted is calculated. Table 1 provides the descriptions 
and questions used in the GSS while table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the 
social capital items used in this study. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital Items in the GSS 
Items    Obs. Mean S. D. Min. Max. 
1. Voter Turnout 
Average percent of respondents vote in presidential 
elections  
142 .705 .063 .547 .869 
2. Informal Socialization 
Percentage of respondents that spend the evening at 
bar at least once a month 
142
  
.264
  
.079
  
.036
  
.5 
Percentage of respondents that spend the evening 
with friends at least once a month 
142 .638 .067 .394 .776 
Percentage of respondents that spend the evening 
with neighbors at least once a month 
142 .509 .073 .349 .719 
Percentage of respondents that spend the evening 
with relatives at least once a month  
142 .705 .063 .488 .853 
3. Religious Participation 
Percentage of respondents that attend religious 
services at least once a month  
142 .434 .091 .212 .753 
4. Social Trust 
Percentage of respondents that believe people can 
be trusted 
142 .395 .107 .124 .678 
 
3.2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Social Capital 
 Principal component analysis (PCA), which is a statistical technique for data reduction, is 
used to develop state-level social capital measure that varies by decades. PCA aims to find unit-
length linear combinations of the variables with greatest variance (capturing the maximum 
possible information from the original variables).To avoid unreliable estimates, choosing an 
arbitrary sample size as a threshold is required since there are fewer number of respondents for 
some questions in some states in the GSS data. Following Uslaner and Brown (2005), a 
minimum sample of 50 respondents is selected, and the observations that have less than 50 
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respondents are dropped. That leads this study to drop two of the informal socializing variables 
such as socializing with siblings and socializing with parents, and the membership variable since 
most of the observations from the original data have less than 50 respondents and do not pass the 
arbitrary threshold. Finally, 142 observations for U.S. contiguous states (some states are dropped 
due to the fewer observations) are retained for this study. 
 Table 3 presents the principal components loadings from PCA. The first three principal 
components among the seven components are retained since these components have eigenvalues 
greater 1; furthermore, they explain 71.96 percent of variation in the original data set. The first 
component has higher eigenvalue than the two other components. Moreover, there is the drop of 
eigenvalues after the first component, and the difference between eigenvalues of first and second 
components is 1.24254. The first component explains the most variation in the data followed by 
the second and third component. The first component explains 36.80 percent of variation in all 
the components, followed by, the second and third components explaining 19.05 percent of 
variation and 16.11 percent of variation in all the components respectively. 
 The first component captures mostly voter turnout and social trust; it also captures one 
element of informal socialization – socializing at bar. The second component captures 
components of informal socializing – mostly socializing with community and socializing with 
relatives –, and religious participation. Compared to the two other components, the second 
component loads more on religious participation. The third component captures mostly social 
trust and socializing with friends – one of the main components of informal socialization. 
 As one of the objectives of this study is to create a single index of social capital, the first 
component is retained as the social capital index. Only the predicted scores from the first 
component is used as the single index of social capital since all the components retained (also the 
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predicted scores for each component) after principal component loadings are not correlated to 
each other. In addition, the first component explains the most variations in the items that are used 
to develop the social capital index. To check the appropriateness of using the PCA method for 
the data to develop the social capital index of this study, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling 
adequacy test is performed, and the overall KMO value is 0.5813 indicating a satisfactory score - 
(any KMO value above 50 is considered as satisfactory) Hence, the PCA method is appropriate 
to develop the social capital index from the GSS data. 
Table 3: Principal Components Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
   Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Unexplained 
variation 
Eigenvalues 2.58 1.33 1.13  
Proportion of variance 0.368 0.191 0.1611 0.2804 
1. Voter Turnout 
Average percent of respondents vote 
in presidential elections  
0.4277     0.1948     0.1407      .4558 
2. Informal Socialization 
Percentage of respondents that spend 
the evening at bar at least once a 
month 
0.4404   0.3979  - 0.1184       .2736 
Percentage of respondents that spend 
the evening with friends at least once a 
month 
0.3138    0.3640     -0.6069       .1542 
Percentage of respondents that spend 
the evening with neighbors at least 
once a month 
-0.2144    0.5231   0.3921     .3432 
Percentage of respondents that spend 
the evening with relatives at least once 
a month  
-0.3601     0.4142    -0.3494      .2979 
3. Religious Participation 
Percentage of respondents that attend 
religious services at least once a 
month  
-0.3738   0.4571    0.2481     .146 
4. Social Trust 
Percentage of respondents that agree 
people can be trusted 
0.4567    0.1308  0.5104        .292 
 KMO measure  0.5813 
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3.3. Ranking Social Capital in U.S. Contiguous States  
 With the developed social capital index for U.S. contiguous states, it is possible to rank 
social capital in U.S. contiguous states. Tables 4 to 7 present rankings of social capital in U.S. 
contiguous states in each decade respectively. Some states are not included in the rankings 
because of limited data availability or not passing the arbitrary threshold for minimum sample 
size Hence, states such as Nebraska, Nevada and New Mexico are not included for rankings in 
all decades, and other states such as Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming are not included in three 
different decades. Hence, it is difficult to analyze whether social capital has increased or declined 
in such states over four decades.  
Table 4: Social Capital Rankings for U.S. Contiguous States in the 1970s 
State Rank State Rank State Rank 
Iowa 1 New Jersey 17 North Carolina 33 
Montana 2 Missouri 18 Delaware NA 
Washington 3 Ohio 19 Idaho NA 
Oregon 4 Oklahoma 20 Kentucky NA 
Connecticut 5 Florida 21 Maine NA 
Minnesota 6 Maryland 22 Mississippi NA 
Illinois 7 Arkansas 23 Nebraska NA 
Wisconsin 8 Arizona 24 Nevada NA 
Colorado 9 Tennessee 25 New Hampshire NA 
California 10 Texas 26 New Mexico NA 
Massachusetts 11 West Virginia 27 North Dakota NA 
Michigan 12 Louisiana 28 Rhode Island NA 
Indiana 13 South Carolina 29 South Dakota NA 
Kansas 14 Georgia 30 Utah NA 
New York 15 Virginia 31 Vermont NA 
Pennsylvania 16 Alabama 32 Wyoming NA 
 
 Table 4 presents rankings of social capital in U.S. contiguous states in the 1970s. This 
study observes, in the 1970s, that Iowa ranks number 1, followed by Montana, Washington, 
Oregon and Connecticut, while South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Alabama and North Carolina 
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are in the bottom five. In the 1980s, Oregon and Washington, the states that are in the top five of 
the rankings in the 1970s, are still in the top five while states such as Alabama and North 
Carolina are still in the bottom five - same as in the 1970s - as reported in table 5. Social capital 
rankings in the 1990s are provided in the table 6. Minnesota ranks number 1, and it is along with 
Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota and Washington to stand as the top five states that have 
the highest social capital in the 1990s compared to the other states. On the other hand, the 
southern states such as Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama are in the bottom five. Table 7 
presents rankings of social capital in the 2000s. Among the ranked states, Kansas ranks number 
1, followed by Colorado, Maine, Minnesota and Oregon, in the 2000s. The southern states rank 
in the lowest five – Alabama, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Georgia and Arkansas. 
Table 5: Social Capital Rankings for U.S. Contiguous States in the 1980s 
State Rank State Rank State Rank 
Oregon 1 Pennsylvania 17 Georgia 33 
Wyoming 2 Maryland 18 Kentucky 34 
Washington 3 New Jersey 19 Tennessee 35 
Wisconsin 4 Florida 20 North Carolina 36 
North Dakota 5 Kansas 21 Arkansas 37 
New Hampshire 6 Virginia 22 Alabama 38 
Colorado 7 Missouri 23 Delaware NA 
Minnesota 8 South Carolina 24 Idaho NA 
Massachusetts 9 Ohio 25 Maine NA 
Arizona 10 New York 26 Mississippi  NA 
Illinois 11 Oklahoma 27 Montana NA 
Iowa 12 Indiana 28 Nebraska NA 
California 13 Texas 29 Nevada NA 
Connecticut 14 Utah 30 New Mexico NA 
Michigan 15 West Virginia 31 South Dakota NA 
Rhode Island 16 Louisiana 32 Vermont NA 
 
 Social capital in Kansas has grown the most over the past decades – especially from the 
1980s to the 2000s. This study observes that Minnesota, Colorado, Oregon and Washington have 
stable and high social capital over the past four decades while social capital in the southern states 
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is considered as the lowest – questioning the causes of low social capital in the south. It is 
important to keep in mind that some states are excluded in the rankings because of the data 
limitation. It would be worth to notice that the rankings might be a bit different if none of states 
are excluded in the rankings. 
Table 6: Social Capital Rankings for U.S. Contiguous States in the 1990s 
State Rank State Rank State Rank 
Minnesota 1 Michigan 17 North Carolina 33 
Colorado 2 Indiana 18 Tennessee 34 
North Dakota 3 Illinois 19 Kentucky 35 
South Dakota 4 Missouri 20 Alabama 36 
Washington 5 Virginia 21 Arkansas NA 
Vermont 6 New York 22 Idaho NA 
Massachusetts 7 Maryland 23 Iowa NA 
Wisconsin 8 Georgia 24 Maine NA 
Oregon 9 Ohio 25 Nebraska NA 
Arizona 10 Oklahoma 26 Nevada NA 
Montana 11 Texas 27 New Hampshire NA 
Kansas 12 Pennsylvania 28 New Mexico NA 
California 13 South Carolina 29 Rhode Island NA 
Connecticut 14 New Jersey 30 Utah NA 
Louisiana 15 Delaware 31 West Virginia NA 
Florida 16 Mississippi 32 Wyoming NA 
 
Table 7: Social Capital Rankings for U.S. Contiguous States in the 2000s 
State Rank State Rank State Rank 
Kansas 1 South Carolina 17 Georgia 33 
Colorado 2 Indiana 18 Arkansas 34 
Minnesota 3 Illinois 19 Connecticut NA 
Maine 4 Michigan 20 Delaware NA 
Oregon 5 Maryland 21 Kentucky NA 
Wyoming 6 Pennsylvania 22 Mississippi NA 
Idaho 7 Ohio 23 Montana NA 
Massachusetts 8 Florida 24 Nebraska NA 
Washington 9 West Virginia 25 Nevada NA 
Iowa 10 Missouri 26 New Hampshire NA 
California 11 Tennessee 27 New Mexico NA 
Wisconsin 12 Texas 28 North Dakota NA 
Virginia 13 North Carolina 29 Rhode Island NA 
Arizona 14 Alabama 30 South Dakota NA 
New York 15 Oklahoma 31 Utah NA 
New Jersey 16 Louisiana 32 Vermont NA 
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3.4. Drawbacks of the Social Capital Index 
 There are several drawbacks in the developed social capital index of this study. First, the 
GSS is not designed for state-level estimates but individual-level estimates, hence this study 
aggregates individuals’ estimates to generate data for each state in a particular time period 
(decades here). Second, data for Nebraska and Nevada in all periods are not available, moreover, 
no data is available for some states in some periods. For instance, there is no data for North 
Dakota in the 1970s. Third, even when there is data for some states in a particular period, 
dropping observations is inevitable if there are less respondents for these states than the threshold 
of minimum sample size, which is required to avoid inaccurate estimates. 
 The major drawback of the social capital index is excluding associational membership 
variable. Following the work of Uslaner and Brown (2005), minimum sample of 50 respondents 
is chosen, and that causes many observations to be dropped. The trade-off between keeping more 
observations in the estimations and including membership variable is inevitable; that leads to 
drop the membership variables in PCA analysis of developing the composite social capital index 
in U.S. contiguous states. Even though the social capital index in this study is not flawless, it 
enables this study to investigate the link between economic freedom and social capital which is 
the main objective of this study. 
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4. ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 This section discusses about definition of economic freedom, comparisons between 
economic freedom and other types of freedom such as political liberty and civil liberty, and 
effects of economic freedom on political, social and economic issues. 
4.1. What is Economic Freedom? 
 In the Economic Freedom of the World (1975-1995), Gwartney et al. (1996), mention that 
the main ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, protection of private property, 
and freedom of exchange. Gwartney and Lawson (2003) adds an additional component – 
freedom to compete in market activities (which means that individuals have rights to compete 
and enter markets whichever they desire without the orders of anyone or any governing body) – 
to the ingredients of economic freedom. Gwartney et al. (1996, p.12) define economic freedom 
in this way: “Individuals have economic freedom, when (a) property they acquire without the use 
of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and (b) they are free to 
use, exchange, or give away their property as long as their actions do not violate the identical 
rights of others.” 
 When economic freedom is present, all decision makings are left to individuals. Hence, 
individuals decide what and how much to consume or produce, for whom to produce, what 
markets to enter, when to enter or leave the market, and so on (Karabegovic et al. 2003). With 
the presence of economic freedom, the basic questions of economics are answered; individuals 
themselves handle all economic transactions with their own decisions dictated by the market. 
Hence, the presence of economic freedom guarantees individuals something they value that is 
not separable from humanity, and freedom that comes with humanity has intrinsic value 
(Gwartney et al. 1996). 
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4.2. Economic Freedom and the Role of Government 
 What affects economic freedom? Government highly influences economic freedom as the 
presence of economic freedom is contingent on actions of government. If government involves 
more than required in individuals’ lives, economic freedom of individuals is more likely to 
decrease. So what should government do not to infringe on individuals’ economic freedom? 
Government needs to limit its role in individuals’ daily lives. The ideal role of government is to 
provide protective and productive functions to their citizens (Gwartney et al. 1996). Protective 
function means that government has to provide strong legal structure and law enforcement 
system to individuals; productive function means that government is responsible for providing 
limited set of public goods such as national defense to citizens. Any government actions beyond 
these functions are not beneficial to individuals and decrease economic freedom as private 
choice is restricted by government actions. 
 In general, economic freedom demands government to provide legal protection (as a 
protective function) to individuals. Legal protection is important for economic progress. If 
property rights are not guaranteed to individuals, aggressors (including the state) can take their 
properties by force or expropriating. In addition, the absence of legal protection limits voluntary 
exchange of individuals, and it leads to reduced economic progress. For instance, suppose a 
simple trading scenario between persons A and B; A and B voluntarily agree that they will 
exchange goods X and Y. Without legal protection, A can take Y from B by exercising force 
without providing X to B, and vice versa. With the presence of strong legal institutions, both A 
and B are protected by property rights and that ensures that no one would appropriate other’s 
properties. In addition, government cannot dictate both A and B to trade or not to trade; the 
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market will lead A and B to decide whether to trade or what to trade. In such a way, the presence 
of legal protection reduces transaction costs in economic activity. 
4.3. Economic Freedom and other Types of Freedom 
 Freedom is an integral part of humanity, and economic freedom is different from other 
types of freedom such as political freedom and civil liberty (Gwartney et al. 1996). Political 
freedom guarantees individuals to elect government officials and involve in political issues 
voluntarily. On the other hand, civil liberty guarantees individuals to hold different religious 
views, different expressions, freedom of press and assembly. 
 Gwartney and Lawson (2003) argue that the presence of economic freedom can increase 
political freedom and civil liberty, and vice versa. For instance, when economic freedom is 
present, individuals’ choices are not limited, and hence they can decide what to produce, 
consume and such. Through this experience, individuals voluntarily participate in political issues 
such as voting in free and fair elections, and individuals also voluntarily hold opinion regarding 
religions and such. Experiences of Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea show that increase in 
economic freedom is likely to cause increases in political freedom. Likewise, the presence of 
strong legal institutions provided by elected government officials can increase economic 
freedom. By that way, political and civil liberties can increase economic freedom. 
 Gwartney and Lawson (2003), however, caution that governments that guarantee political 
and civil liberties may set policies that conflict with economic freedom as democratic 
governments can impose higher taxation and expenditures, for instance, Scandinavian countries. 
Such kind of government involvement would be beneficial only in those countries, where 
societies are racially homogeneous, and the citizens of such counties consider distribution of 
welfare through taxes as helping their own people (Sachs 2008). 
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4.4. Effects of Economic Freedom 
 Both country-level and state-level studies have found that economic freedom has no 
infringement on broad categories of political, social and economic issues2. Using the Economic 
Freedom of the World Index, first developed by Gwartney et al. in 1996 to measure economic 
freedom at international level, studies find that economic freedom has positive significant effect 
on growth across countries3, for examples, Dawson (1998, 2003); Gwartney et al. (1999); de 
Haan and Sturm (2000); Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002); Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008). 
Moreover, Berggren (1999) finds that economic freedom does not harm equality; Scully (2002) 
finds the economic freedom has a positive impact on both economic growth and income equality. 
Economic freedom affects not just on growth and income equality, Burgess et al. (2009) find that 
economic freedom also can reduce both internal and external conflicts. 
 Karabegovic et al. (2002) first developed the North America Economic Freedom Index, 
an extension of the Economic Freedom of the World Index, to measure economic freedom in 
U.S. states and Canada provinces. Taking advantage of the North America Economic Freedom 
Index, scholars have been able to examine impacts of economic freedom on social and economic 
issues at state level in the U.S. Karabegovic et al. (2003) find that economic freedom has positive 
effects on economic growth in U.S. states and Canadian provinces. Their findings were 
confirmed by Compton et al. (2011) via evidence from U.S. states. 
 Ashby and Sobel (2008); Bennett and Vedder (2013); and Apergis et al. (2014) examine 
the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality in U.S. states and confirm 
that an increase in economic freedom reduces income inequality across U.S. states. Moreover, 
                                                 
2A list of the articles that study the effects of economic freedom on social and economic issues can be found at 
http://www.freetheworld.com/papers.html  
3 Berggren (2003) surveys the benefits of economic freedom on different issues such as growth, income equality, 
wealth, quality of life and the like.  
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economic freedom can promote entrepreneurship in the U.S. (Kreft and Sobel 2005; Hall et al. 
2013). Apergis et al. (2012) examine the effect of economic freedom on corruption in U.S. states 
and find a negative relationship between long-run economic freedom and corruption; Belasen 
and Hafer (2012) find a positive relationship between economic freedom and well-being. The 
above studies are some selected examples of studies that examine the effects of economic 
freedom on socio-economic issues, and no single study has found negative impacts of economic 
freedom on social and economic issues both at international- and state-level so far. Hence, the 
health of a country or society is contingent on economic freedom, ceteris paribus. 
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5. THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 North (1991) mentions that institutions provide ground for economic, political and social 
interactions. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that there might be a link between economic 
freedom as an economic institution and social capital, which is a product of social interactions. 
However, the theoretical link or relationship between economic freedom and social capital is 
ambiguous depending on definitions and measurements of social capital. Both economic freedom 
and social capital can help individuals reduce transaction cost as mentioned in the previous 
sections. Economic freedom can serve as a substitute for social capital in terms of associational 
memberships (or ties) and social trust in market activities. If so, there might be a negative 
relationship between economic freedom and social capital or may be no relationship at all. If not, 
the link might be a positive relationship. 
 Social capital is considered as both an investment and a consumption. Individuals invest 
in social capital, for instance – involving in all sorts of social occasions in both formal and 
informal settings requires individuals to invest their time at least, to consume benefits generated 
through social interactions. With the presence of economic freedom, individuals are granted legal 
protections in market activities that enforce contracts and negotiations involved in market 
activities and reduce transaction costs. Then, it might lead individuals not to invest in social 
capital since close ties or trust among individuals to make transactions easier is substituted by the 
legal protection in market activities. In such way, economic freedom can reduce social capital. 
 On the other hand, there might be no link between economic freedom and social capital 
as historical or cultural ties among individuals may not be affected by the presence of economic 
freedom. Referring to the example of the Jewish community in New York City offered by 
Coleman (1988), economic freedom may not affect social interactions in the community as the 
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culture and history of the Jewish community would make social interactions amongst the 
community habitual. These factors can undermine the fact that social capital is form of 
investment. Hence, even when economic freedom is present, Jewish would still involve in social 
occasions to consume other benefits rather than economic ones. 
 It is also possible to think that economic freedom can have a positive impact on social 
capital. As previously stated, social capital can be described as a process of accumulating 
intangible capital that later brings benefits to not only individuals but also society as a whole. 
Accumulating social capital begins when individuals interact. That could be as simple as the 
building of friendship among individuals, and as complex as relationships among members of a 
community and even the relationships between economic agents in market activities. So how 
would economic freedom increase social capital in market activities? When economic freedom is 
present, individuals are free to involve in voluntary exchange and guarded against all the odds 
that might arise during transactions. Hence, individuals’ decisions such as whom to trade with or 
what to trade shall entirely be left to themselves. Thus, economic freedom grants individuals to 
participate in economic activities by their own decisions, and that leads individuals to interact 
with other agents in the market place. Then, it is reasonable to imply that more economic 
freedom leads to more interactions among individuals, and that eventually lead to building trust 
among individuals as they participate in market activities. 
 Jackson et al. (2014) also mention that individuals can use economic freedom to form 
associations; moreover, economic freedom can bring benefits to individuals in terms of 
generating economic benefits such as additional income and leisure, hence, people can use those 
benefits to involve in civic engagement. Hence, economic freedom may encourage people to 
involve more in religious affairs (or joining hobby clubs) as the results of benefits, which are in 
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forms of additional income and leisure, generated by economic freedom. On the other hand, it 
may not be a case in a society where people are religious and participation in religious affairs is 
considered as a custom. 
 The presence of economic freedom would enable individuals to practice their freedom in 
political affairs as well. Then, economic freedom may increase voter turnout as individuals make 
their own decisions on whom to elect as their officials just like the way they make their decisions 
in market activities. However, one should not undermine political liberty since it might influence 
individuals’ decisions more than economic freedom in political affairs. Hence, economic 
freedom may not affect political participation of individuals in democratic countries but the 
impact of economic freedom might be positive and influential on individuals in less democratic 
countries. Hence, economic freedom may even increase political freedom (that channels increase 
in voter turnout) in less democratic countries or societies as mentioned by Gwartney and Lawson 
(2003). Therefore, the effect of economic freedom on social capital in terms of voter turnout may 
be contingent on political nature of a county. Hence, the relationship between economic freedom 
and social capital is ambiguous theoretically; and there are not enough empirical studies on that 
issue. Hence, it remains questionable. 
 Berggren and Jordahl (2006) conduct a cross-countries study to examine the effect of 
economic freedom on social capital in term of trust by using the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World, and generalized trust from the World Value Survey. Instead of 
investigating the effect of overall economic freedom on trust, they investigate the effect of each 
area of economic freedom (Economic Freedom of World Index is made up of five areas) on 
generalized trust (which is defined as trusting people in general no matter you know or not while 
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particularized trust is defined as trusting people you know)4. They find that “legal structure and 
security of property rights” is important to build generalized trust and positive effect on that. 
“Access to sound money” is also statistically significant and positively related with trust. 
“Regulation of credit, labor, and business” is positively related to trust and statistically 
significant only when other control variables are not included. The other two areas of economic 
freedom such as “size of government” and “freedom to exchange with foreigners” are not 
significant in any type of models. In addition, they find that religious fractionalization, economic 
inequality (Gini) and religion are statistically significant and tends to decrease trust. They 
conclude that economic freedom has a positive effect on social capital (defined as trust), and 
“legal structure and security of property rights” is the most important factor building trust. 
 Jackson et al. (2014) investigate the effect of economic freedom on social capital (defined 
in civic engagement, community organizational life and community volunteerism) in a different 
approach. Using a dynamic panel of U.S. states, they are able to control for variance over time 
and across states to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias (which may arise as an issue to 
Berggren and Jordahl’s study (2006)).They find that the level of economic freedom has a 
significant and negative impact on the level of social capital when OLS estimation method is 
applied while they find that the change in economic freedom has no effect on social capital. 
Since the nature of endogeneity between economic freedom and social capital as mentioned by 
Berggren and Jordahl (2006), Jackson et al. (2014) exploit the System Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation technique to handle the endogeneity. When endogeneity is 
controlled, no significant relationship between the level of economic freedom and the growth 
                                                 
4In contrast to generalized and particularized trust, Putnam (2000) distinguishes another type of trust – trust in 
government – from trust among people. Putnam (2000, p.137) defines trust in government as “a cause or a 
consequence of social trust, but it is not the same thing as social trust.” 
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rate of social capital is found. They find that racial homogeneity and education has significant 
effect on social capital. They conclude that there is no clear link between economic freedom and 
social capital. Since these two empirical studies show different results of the link between 
economic freedom and social capital, more research on the issue is required. This study serves to 
add another literature on the issue of economic freedom (or institutions) and social capital. 
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6. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
6.1. Data 
 This study examines the relationship between economic freedom and social capital in 
U.S. contiguous states during three decades – from the 1980s to the 2000s. This study defines the 
decade 1980s as the period covering years from 1981 to 1990, and the same pattern follows for 
the 1990s and the 2000s. The measures of social capital are obtained from the Generalized Social 
Survey (GSS); two measures of social capital are used in this study as different measures of 
social capital were used in previous studies – particularized trust, synonymous with social trust, 
in Berggren and Jordahl (2006), and a social capital index of Hawes et al (2013), which does not 
include social trust, in Jackson et al. (2014). The first measure of social capital is overall social 
capital (referred as “social capital” instead of using overall social capital in this study) developed 
by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as described in the section 3. The second measure 
of social capital is social trust. 
 The data for economic freedom is obtained from the Fraser Institute’s North America 
Economic Freedom Index, updated by Stansel and McMahon (2013), and the data spans from 
1981 to 2011. The North American Economic Freedom Index is measured at two levels - the 
subnational level (which includes provincial and municipal governments in Canada, and the state 
and local governments in the U.S.); the all-government level (that includes all level of 
governments - federal, provincial/state, and municipal/local) – in Canada and the U.S. The 
purpose of measuring economic freedom at two different government levels is to examine 
impacts of different levels of government on economic freedom. A scale from 0 to 10 was used 
to indicate the level of economic freedom in a particular state; the number 10 is assigned to a 
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state which has the highest level of economic freedom while the number 0 is assigned to indicate 
the lowest level of economic freedom. 
 The overall economic freedom is composed of three main equally weighted areas – Size 
of Government, Takings and Discriminatory Taxation, and Labor Market Freedom; each area is 
made up of subcomponents. Size of government consists of three subcomponents – General 
Consumption Expenditures by Government as a Percentage of GDP, Transfers and Subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP, and Social Security Payments as a Percentage of GDP. The main idea of this 
area is to give an idea of role of government in a free economy. Economic freedom is reduced 
when government involves beyond productive and protective functions of government (i.e. 
government should not spend more than providing public goods such as the national defense). 
Taxing one person to support another individual violates the property rights of individuals by 
government. In addition, replacing private choice for retirement with mandatory government 
arrangements decreases economic freedom of individuals (Stansel and McMahon 2013). 
 The second area of economic freedom - Takings and Discriminatory Taxation – is 
composed of four subcomponents: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP, Top Marginal 
Income Tax Rate, and the Income Threshold at Which It Applies, Indirect Tax Revenue as a 
Percentage of GDP and Sales Taxes Collected as a Percentage of GDP. This component captures 
the idea that economic freedom diminishes when tax burden restricts private choice. Economic 
freedom diminishes more when collected taxes spent are not close to services that government 
provides (Stansel and McMahon 2013). Moreover, Gwartney et al. (1996) state that “high 
marginal tax rates discriminate against the productive citizens and deny them the fruits of their 
labor”. 
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 The final area of economic freedom – Labor Market Freedom – composed of Minimum 
Wage Legislation, Government Employment as a Percentage of Total State/Provincial 
Employment, and Union Density (measured by percentage of unionized workers in a state). This 
area stresses that economic freedom is reduced when government makes restrictions on labor 
markets. Minimum wage laws can have negative impacts on the work force rather than positive 
impacts as it restricts the ability of employees and employers to negotiate contracts to their 
liking. High demands or levels of government employment may indicate that governments is 
providing goods and services that could be supplied by private sector. Union Density may 
indicate that government violates rights of workers to join union or not by forcing employees to 
join union. It is important to keep in mind that the term “economic freedom” refers to the overall 
economic freedom index, and the term “economic freedom measures” refers to both the overall 
economic freedom index and its three areas in this study. 
 To isolate effect of economic freedom measures on social capital, a set of control 
variables is included. The selection of control variables is based on the previous studies such as 
Glaeser et al. (2002), Berggren and Jordahl (2006), and Jackson et al. (2014). The set of control 
variables in this study includes education (Educ) measured by the percentage of population of a 
state that is 25 years or older with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, income inequality measure that 
is the gini coefficient on income inequality of a state (Gini), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
racial homogeneity (HHI) to measure a state’s racial homogeneity5, the percentage of population 
                                                 
5 
 
where k indexes for racial group in state i, and s is the percentage of each racial group population. The above 
formula is used to calculate for HHI index. Four racial groups (Caucasian; African American; American Indian & 
Alaska Native; and Asian & Pacific Islander) are included in calculation of HHI index. According to US Census 
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of a state residing in metropolitan areas (Metro), the log of the household median income of a 
state in 2012 US dollars (logIncome), the log of  population of a state (logpop), unemployment 
rate of a state (Unemployment), the percentage of a state’s population that is 25 years or younger 
(Young) and the percentage of a state’s population that own house (Homeownership). The 
variable – Homeownership – is not included in both previous studies – Berggren and Jordahl 
(2006) and Jackson et al. (2014) but Glaeser et al. (2002) document the significant effect of 
homeownership on social capital. 
 Data for education, income inequality (Gini), HHI index of racial homogeneity, 
population and homeownership are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau; data for 
unemployment rate and the percentage of younger population come from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). Data for household median income and the metro population are gathered from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As this study focuses on decennial data, the average 
value of each variable within a decade is used if annual data is available for each decade. Hence, 
average values for following variables – Metro, Income, Population, Unemployment, Young and 
Homeownership6 - are used for a particular state in a decade. As decennial data for education is 
available from 1990, 2000 and 2010 surveys from the U.S. Census Bureau, we do not calculate 
average value for education variable. Data for Gini and HHI is not available annually so data 
from 1990, 2000 and 2010 of these variables are used for each decade respectively. Table 8 
presents descriptions of the variables, and table 9 presents the summary statistics of the variables, 
and social capital measures have less observations than the other variables. 
                                                 
Bureau, Hispanic origin is considered an ethnicity, not a race; Hispanics may be of any race. Hence, Hispanics is not 
included in calculation of HHI index as a race. 
 
6 Data from 1981 to 1983 is not available for variables – income and homeownership. Hence, the average values 
from 1984 to 1990. Monthly data is used for unemployment, so first average values for each year are calculated and 
then average values for each decade are calculated. 
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Table 8: Descriptions of the Variables 
Variables Descriptions 
SC Social Capital  
CSC Change in Social Capital 
Trust Social Trust 
CTrust Change in Social Trust 
Vote Voter Turnout 
CVote Change in Voter Turnout 
Religion Religious Participation 
CReligion Change in Religious Participation  
EFAL Economic Freedom measured at All Government Level 
EFSL Economic Freedom measured at Subnational Level 
SGAL Size of Government measured at All Government Level 
SGSL Size of Government measured at Subnational Level 
TDTAL Takings and Discriminatory Taxation measured at All Government 
Level 
TDTSL Takings and Discriminatory Taxation measured at Subnational 
Level 
LMAL Labor Market Freedom measured at All Government Level 
LMSL Labor Market Freedom measured at Subnational Level 
CEFAL Change in Economic Freedom measured at All Government Level 
CEFSL Change in Economic Freedom measured at Subnational Level 
CSGAL Change in Size of Government measured at All Government Level 
CSGSL Change in Size of Government measured at Subnational Level 
CTDTAL Change in Takings and Discriminatory Taxation measured at All 
Government Level 
CTDTSL Change in Takings and Discriminatory Taxation measured at 
Subnational Level 
CLMAL Change in Labor Market Freedom measured at All Government 
Level 
CLMSL Change in Labor Market Freedom measured at Subnational Level 
Educ The percentage of population of a state that is 25 years or older with 
a Bachelor’s degree or higher 
Gini Gini Index of Income Inequality 
HHI HHI index of Racial Homogeneity 
Metro The percentage of population of a state residing in metropolitan 
areas 
Young The percentage of a state’s population that is 25 years or younger 
Homeownership The percentage of a state’s population that own house 
logIncome The log of household median income 
logPop The log of level of state’s population 
Unemployment Unemployment rate of a state 
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Table 9: Summary Statistics 
Variables N. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
SC 108 0.087 1.586 -3.652 3.133 
CSC 91 0.095 1.063 -2.745 2.928 
Trust 110 0.378 0.107 0.124 0.679 
CTrust 96 -0.033 0.068 -0.218 0.152 
Vote 112 0.712 0.059 0.572 0.869 
CVote 99 0.007 0.049 -0.134 0.141 
Religion 112 0.429 0.090 0.212 0.753 
CReligion 99 -0.014 0.059 -0.164 0.181 
EFAL 144 6.644 0.521 5.133 8.116 
EFSL 144 6.808 0.684 5.124 8.082 
SGAL 144 7.149 0.843 4.402 8.849 
SGSL 144 7.327 0.883 5.332 9.073 
TDTAL 144 6.142 0.497 5.086 7.682 
TDTSL 144 6.477 0.787 4.370 8.400 
LMAL 144 6.641 0.762 4.410 8.006 
LMSL 144 6.620 0.862 4.396 8.596 
CEFAL 144 0.371 0.749 -0.698 1.852 
CEFSL 144 0.028 0.543 -1.431 1.207 
CSGAL 144 -0.191 0.750 -2.036 1.098 
CSGSL 144 -0.363 0.846 -2.542 1.712 
CTDTAL 144 0.570 1.287 -1.816 3.118 
CTDTSL 144 0.015 0.671 -2.913 1.599 
CLMAL 144 0.734 0.721 -0.396 2.233 
CLMSL 144 0.433 0.620 -1.660 1.880 
Educ 144 0.236 0.054 0.123 0.390 
Gini 144 0.443 0.022 0.385 0.499 
HHI 144 0.735 0.128 0.470 0.973 
Metro 144 0.738 0.194 0.293 1.000 
Young 144 0.379 0.032 0.318 0.511 
Homeownership 144 0.683 0.049 0.516 0.785 
logIncome 144 10.83 0.153 10.436 11.154 
logPop 144 15.062 0.991 13.073 17.397 
Unemployment 144 0.059 0.015 .027 0.104 
 
6.2. Empirical Approach 
 The following model is used to estimate the link between economic freedom measures 
and social capital measures: 
 𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 +  𝑣𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (Eq.1) 
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where i indexes for states and t indexes for time.  is the measures of social capital (both overall 
social capital and trust),  is the measures of economic freedom, and  is the set of control 
variables. The terms  and  represent unobserved state fixed-effect and time effect respectively, 
and  is the error term. 
 The main variable of interest in this study is economic freedom measures, which is 
considered in two forms – the average levels of economic freedom measures during the decade 
and the changes in economic freedom measures between two consecutive decades, by following 
the previous literature on economic freedom and growth (for instance, Compton et al. 2011). 
Compton et al. (2011, p.427) state that “…the “level” of freedom in our regressions measures 
short-run deviations from long-run mean of freedom, while the “change” of freedom measures 
short-run deviations from long-run mean of changes in freedom.” to make a distinction between 
the use of “level” and “change” of variables in regressions. This study also considers the 
dependent variable, social capital measures, in two forms – the average level of social capital 
(and social trust) in a decade, and the change in social capital (and social trust) between two 
consecutive decades. Considering the dependent variable and the variable of interest in two 
forms allow this study to see whether different modeling in variables produces different results. 
 The panel dataset allows this study to capture variances over time (for instance, policy or 
institutional changes over time) and across states (heterogeneity in institutions and cultural 
background etc. among U.S. contiguous states). The empirical model is estimated by using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The panel data set allows this study to apply different 
OLS panel estimation methods – OLS (pooled method), OLS with time-fixed effects, OLS with 
state-fixed effects, and OLS with both time- and state- fixed effects – to examine the relationship 
between economic freedom and social capital. The reasons of using different OLS methods is to 
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see whether the variable of interest (economic freedom) is still significant for the dependent 
variable (social capital) when time- and state- fixed effects are accounted. 
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7. RESULTS 
 In this section, the results of the links between economic freedom and social capital (trust 
as well) are discussed. As economic freedom is measured at two levels – subnational level and 
all government level, the results are presented in two separate subsections. Subsection 7.1 
presents the effects of subnational level economic freedom on social capital and trust while 
subsection 7.2 presents the effects of all government level economic freedom on social capital 
and trust. Since data for other components of social capital is available, the effects of economic 
freedom on these components also are discussed in subsection 7.3. 
7.1. Effects of Subnational Level Economic Freedom Measures 
 Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates of the effect of the level of subnational level 
economic freedom index (EFSL) on the level of social capital. Columns 1 and 2 of table 9 
present coefficient estimates of OLS (pooled method) without additional control variables and 
with additional control variables respectively. Columns 3 and 4 follow the same pattern but they 
present coefficient estimates of OLS with time-fixed effects while columns 5 and 6 present the 
estimates of OLS with state-fixed effects. Regression estimates reported in columns 7 and 8 
include both time- and state- fixed effects. All the tables reporting regression estimates follow 
the same format. 
 The results in table 9 suggest that the effect of the level of economic freedom on the level 
of social capital is negative. Economic freedom is not significant in columns 1 through 4 while it 
becomes significant at 10 percent level when state-fixed effects, and both time- and state- fixed 
effects are controlled in columns 5 through 8. Only additional control variable that is significant 
is the percentage of a state’s population residing in a metropolitan area when state-fixed effects 
are controlled. It suggests that an increase in percent of population living in a metro area (metro) 
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can increase the level of social capital. The value of 𝑅2, the coefficient of determination, gets 
significantly larger when state-fixed effects are included as reported in column 5. The value of 
𝑅2 of column 1 reports that the model can explain 0.3 percent of variation in the level of social 
capital while 90.7 percent of variation is explained in column 8. Therefore, including additional 
control variables time- and state-fixed effects can increase explanatory power. 
Table 10: Level of Economic Freedom (SL) and Level of Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables  OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS TF OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
EFSL -0.131 -0.0476 -0.131 -0.0432 -0.301* -0.317* -0.303* -0.331* 
 (0.245) (0.262) (0.246) (0.264) (0.159) (0.164) (0.170) (0.175) 
Educ  -0.453  -0.108  -0.566  -0.0336 
  (5.962)  (6.007)  (4.238)  (4.452) 
Gini  8.537  7.989  -7.755  -8.307 
  (14.14)  (14.35)  (8.686)  (9.479) 
HHI  1.981  1.982  -1.100  -1.334 
  (1.967)  (1.962)  (1.137)  (1.235) 
Metro  1.421  1.525  1.979**  2.137* 
  (1.753)  (1.776)  (0.893)  (1.069) 
logIncome  -1.493  -1.752  -1.136  -1.538 
  (2.674)  (2.715)  (1.613)  (2.014) 
logPop  -0.006  -0.006  -0.186  -0.216 
  (0.264)  (0.265)  (0.148)  (0.160) 
Unemployment  -5.210  -6.347  1.571  2.644 
  (11.59)  (12.12)  (8.556)  (10.33) 
Young  -2.647  -3.143  4.284  4.115 
  (6.492)  (6.477)  (3.875)  (4.325) 
Homeownership  0.194  -0.0165  -1.299  -1.351 
  (3.555)  (3.669)  (2.645)  (2.736) 
1990s   0.0242 -0.0480   0.0160 0.0752 
   (0.376) (0.414)   (0.200) (0.245) 
2000s   0.0129 0.118   -0.0425 0.126 
   (0.390) (0.408)   (0.188) (0.271) 
Constant 0.979 11.68 0.972 14.93 -0.761 16.05 -0.742 21.04 
 (1.672) (32.01) (1.713) (32.35) (1.388) (19.22) (1.435) (24.99) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.003 0.040 0.003 0.042 0.885 0.907 0.885 0.907 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The relationships between the levels of the areas of economic freedom and the level of 
social capital are examined, and the results suggest that the levels of areas of economic freedom - 
size of government, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor market freedom – do not have 
significant effect on the level of social capital. Same as the results from table 9, metro is the only 
significant control variable. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model becomes larger when 
time- and state- fixed effects are included. Results from regression estimates are not reported as 
they are insignificant; instead the summary of these results is reported in column 1 of panel A of 
table 20. 
 The effects of the levels of economic freedom measures on the change in social capital 
are investigated to see whether the levels of economic freedom measures affect differently on 
social capital if social capital is modelled differently. Table 10 presents the results of the effect 
of the level of economic freedom on the change in social capital. The level of economic freedom 
is significant in columns 5 and 7, but not significant in other columns. Significance of level of 
freedom disappears when additional control variables, and time- and state- fixed effects are 
included. None of the additional control variables are significant, and it suggests that nothing has 
significant effects on social capital except state-fixed effects. Two other areas of economic 
freedom – size of government, and takings and discriminatory taxation do not have any 
significant impacts on the change in social capital as well. 
 However, it gets interesting when the link between labor market freedom and social 
capital is examined. Table 11 gives the results of the effect of the level of labor market freedom 
on the change in social capital. Unlike the other measures of economic freedom, the level of 
labor market freedom has a negative effect on the change in social capital and is significant at 10 
percent level when state-fixed effects are controlled; controlling both time- and state- fixed 
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effects increases its significance to 5 percent level. However, its significant level diminishes to 
10 percent level when additional control variables are included. Time dummies are negatively 
significant in columns 7 and 8, and it can be implied that social capital has declined in the 1990s 
and the 2000s compared to the 1980s. Summary of the effects of the levels of economic freedom 
and its areas on the change in social capital is reported in column 2 of panel B of table 20. 
Table 11: Level of Economic Freedom (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
EFSL -0.168 -0.259 -0.162 -0.208 -0.492* -0.562 -0.479* -0.476 
 (0.168) (0.194) (0.171) (0.205) (0.287) (0.337) (0.280) (0.334) 
Educ  3.328  3.572  -3.641  -4.575 
  (4.681)  (4.958)  (6.319)  (6.567) 
Gini  -5.662  -7.124  -14.05  -13.90 
  (9.298)  (9.608)  (12.73)  (12.61) 
HHI  -1.608  -1.283  -2.713  -1.719 
  (1.476)  (1.436)  (2.151)  (2.098) 
Metro  0.342  0.300  2.274  1.983 
  (1.469)  (1.479)  (1.726)  (1.746) 
logIncome  -1.986  -1.967  -1.650  -0.519 
  (1.946)  (1.979)  (2.720)  (2.992) 
logPop  0.0336  0.0950  -0.287  -0.168 
  (0.208)  (0.211)  (0.242)  (0.248) 
Unemployment  -0.987  -5.017  1.562  -8.044 
  (7.470)  (8.467)  (13.42)  (16.22) 
Young  1.169  0.242  2.627  1.104 
  (5.601)  (5.750)  (5.908)  (6.693) 
Homeownership  -3.274  -3.804  -3.806  -4.762 
  (3.319)  (3.451)  (4.536)  (4.787) 
1990s   -0.331 -0.413   -0.450 -0.610 
   (0.259) (0.317)   (0.316) (0.367) 
2000s   -0.350 -0.233   -0.546* -0.487 
   (0.290) (0.310)   (0.281) (0.357) 
Constant 1.254 27.39 1.435 27.48 4.413* 35.14 4.647** 22.74 
 (1.179) (21.99) (1.210) (21.89) (2.216) (32.62) (2.163) (36.71) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.011 0.077 0.034 0.096 0.284 0.406 0.332 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Level of Labor Market Freedom (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
LMSL -0.087 -0.219 -0.120 -0.197 -0.404* -0.469 -0.559** -0.528* 
 (0.129) (0.165) (0.137) (0.177) (0.223) (0.298) (0.242) (0.310) 
Educ  4.908  4.850  -2.155  -3.142 
  (5.132)  (5.387)  (6.737)  (7.017) 
Gini  -4.634  -6.074  -12.45  -11.50 
  (9.703)  (9.939)  (13.30)  (12.65) 
HHI  -1.664  -1.352  -2.514  -1.688 
  (1.451)  (1.419)  (2.063)  (2.002) 
Metro  0.317  0.253  2.190  1.665 
  (1.449)  (1.453)  (1.744)  (1.699) 
logIncome  -2.528  -2.334  -2.605  -0.941 
  (2.087)  (2.090)  (2.968)  (2.981) 
logPop  0.0366  0.103  -0.244  -0.0903 
  (0.209)  (0.212)  (0.242)  (0.259) 
Unemployment  -1.065  -5.015  0.844  -9.296 
  (7.200)  (8.049)  (12.54)  (14.63) 
Young  0.139  -0.506  2.804  1.292 
  (5.561)  (5.707)  (5.688)  (6.299) 
Homeownership  -3.217  -3.550  -4.188  -4.029 
  (3.423)  (3.598)  (4.324)  (4.626) 
1990s   -0.354 -0.435   -0.533* -0.674* 
   (0.257) (0.305)   (0.294) (0.348) 
2000s   -0.398 -0.295   -0.788** -0.691* 
   (0.300) (0.316)   (0.300) (0.370) 
Constant 0.677 32.49 1.137 30.66 3.637** 43.03 5.187*** 24.81 
 (0.889) (23.33) (0.980) (22.86) (1.650) (35.30) (1.846) (36.05) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.005 0.074 0.033 0.096 0.282 0.403 0.365 0.454 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Unlike the levels of economic freedom measures, the changes in economic freedom 
measures affect differently on social capital (both level and change).The changes in economic 
freedom measures, except takings and discriminatory taxation, have positive significant effects 
on social capital. Table 12 gives the results of coefficient estimates of the effect of the change in 
economic freedom on the level of social capital. Results from columns 1 through 4 suggest that 
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the change in economic freedom does not have significant effect on the level of social capital. 
However, its coefficients become statistically significant at 10 percent level when state-fixed 
effects (reported in columns 5 and 6 respectively), and both time- and state- fixed effects 
(reported in columns 7 and 8 respectively) are included. Metro is the only significant control 
variable. 
Table 13: Change in Economic Freedom (SL) and Level of Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CEFSL -0.078 -0.142 -0.078 -0.152 0.453** 0.371** 0.452** 0.377** 
 (0.268) (0.287) (0.270) (0.293) (0.172) (0.168) (0.178) (0.177) 
Educ  -1.014  -0.666  -1.154  -0.720 
  (6.066)  (6.135)  (4.178)  (4.370) 
Gini  7.456  6.670  -4.574  -5.015 
  (14.03)  (14.20)  (8.778)  (9.471) 
HHI  2.167  2.180  -0.0332  -0.181 
  (2.016)  (2.028)  (1.085)  (1.207) 
Metro  1.526  1.641  1.822*  1.956* 
  (1.771)  (1.789)  (0.936)  (1.120) 
logIncome  -1.477  -1.739  -1.057  -1.393 
  (2.694)  (2.735)  (1.642)  (2.003) 
logPop  0.00353  0.00777  -0.200  -0.223 
  (0.260)  (0.262)  (0.148)  (0.163) 
Unemployment  -5.046  -6.581  1.547  2.199 
  (11.69)  (12.14)  (8.129)  (9.389) 
Young  -3.319  -3.892  5.766  5.596 
  (6.384)  (6.292)  (3.887)  (4.209) 
Homeownership  -0.215  -0.480  -3.023  -3.159 
  (3.451)  (3.530)  (2.584)  (2.584) 
1990s   0.007 -0.092   -0.001 0.0483 
   (0.377) (0.416)   (0.184) (0.232) 
2000s   0.000 0.0972   -0.0452 0.100 
   (0.393) (0.410)   (0.193) (0.270) 
Constant 0.0879 11.96 0.0856 15.41 -2.97*** 11.72 -2.95*** 15.82 
 (0.153) (31.84) (0.289) (32.14) (0.638) (19.69) (0.668) (24.60) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.001 0.042 0.001 0.044 0.886 0.907 0.887 0.907 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 51 
Table 14: Change in Size of Government (SL) and Level of Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CSGSL 0.062 0.031 0.063 0.030 0.347** 0.312* 0.348** 0.334* 
 (0.171) (0.189) (0.173) (0.193) (0.156) (0.159) (0.165) (0.179) 
Educ  -0.282  0.065  -1.614  -1.113 
  (6.051)  (6.113)  (4.146)  (4.270) 
Gini  8.775  8.191  -5.090  -5.455 
  (14.02)  (14.20)  (8.827)  (9.561) 
HHI  2.053  2.048  -0.0181  -0.231 
  (2.090)  (2.113)  (1.091)  (1.243) 
Metro  1.379  1.486  1.849*  2.011* 
  (1.768)  (1.791)  (0.967)  (1.154) 
logIncome  -1.529  -1.787  -0.943  -1.374 
  (2.674)  (2.718)  (1.653)  (2.028) 
logPop  -0.003  -0.004  -0.197  -0.234 
  (0.265)  (0.267)  (0.144)  (0.161) 
Unemployment  -5.684  -6.854  2.408  4.029 
  (11.71)  (12.16)  (8.095)  (9.344) 
Young  -2.816  -3.304  6.041  6.066 
  (6.283)  (6.191)  (3.963)  (4.233) 
Homeownership  0.145  -0.063  -3.165  -3.281 
  (3.470)  (3.567)  (2.496)  (2.542) 
1990s   0.022 -0.054   0.022 0.104 
   (0.379) (0.418)   (0.185) (0.244) 
2000s   0.00942 0.116   -0.0187 0.146 
   (0.393) (0.413)   (0.199) (0.288) 
Constant 0.110 11.68 0.0995 14.96 -2.89*** 10.75 -2.89*** 15.84 
 (0.166) (31.86) (0.294) (32.23) (0.664) (19.87) (0.685) (25.07) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.001 0.040 0.001 0.042 0.885 0.908 0.885 0.908 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 13 and 15 report the results of the effects of the change in size government and the 
change in labor market freedom on the level of social capital respectively. The results follow the 
same pattern of table 11. Even though economic freedom and two of it areas have positive 
significant effects on the level of social capital, the second area of economic freedom – takings 
and discriminatory taxation – do not have significant effect on the level of social capital. Table 
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14 reports the estimates of effect of the change in takings and discriminatory taxation on the 
level of social capital. Takings and discriminatory taxation does not seem to have any link with 
social capital. However, metro is still significant variable same as the results from tables 12, 13 
and 15. 
Table 15: Change in Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (SL) and Level of Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CTDTSL -0.069 -0.142 -0.071 -0.146 0.108 -0.004 0.101 0.003 
 (0.221) (0.244) (0.220) (0.248) (0.128) (0.157) (0.136) (0.169) 
Educ  -0.232  0.140  -2.050  -1.537 
  (5.934)  (5.972)  (4.260)  (4.626) 
Gini  7.111  6.369  -6.678  -7.241 
  (14.18)  (14.36)  (9.161)  (9.849) 
HHI  2.090  2.105  0.046  -0.065 
  (1.990)  (1.999)  (1.114)  (1.226) 
Metro  1.558  1.660  2.177**  2.288** 
  (1.758)  (1.772)  (0.972)  (1.125) 
logIncome  -1.653  -1.902  -1.120  -1.414 
  (2.665)  (2.692)  (1.612)  (2.039) 
logPop  0.002  0.008  -0.178  -0.191 
  (0.259)  (0.260)  (0.153)  (0.172) 
Unemployment  -5.180  -6.783  3.396  2.753 
  (11.67)  (12.10)  (8.865)  (10.40) 
Young  -4.122  -4.675  5.424  4.965 
  (6.520)  (6.458)  (4.133)  (4.602) 
Homeownership  0.080  -0.165  -2.712  -2.966 
  (3.416)  (3.503)  (2.551)  (2.640) 
1990s   0.005 -0.101   -0.03 -0.018 
   (0.374) (0.411)   (0.189) (0.243) 
2000s   -0.011 0.080   -0.047 0.069 
   (0.388) (0.412)   (0.203) (0.295) 
Constant 0.0857 14.00 0.0875 17.24 -2.93*** 12.61 -2.91*** 16.48 
 (0.153) (31.74) (0.287) (31.88) (0.682) (19.49) (0.707) (25.36) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.045 0.878 0.901 0.878 0.902 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: Change in Labor Market Freedom (SL) and Level of Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CLMSL -0.202 -0.229 -0.205 -0.248 0.531*** 0.487*** 0.580*** 0.494*** 
 (0.237) (0.274) (0.239) (0.279) (0.185) (0.149) (0.188) (0.166) 
Educ  -1.900  -1.573  -0.10  -0.254 
  (6.422)  (6.477)  (4.083)  (4.458) 
Gini  6.813  5.948  -6.412  -6.199 
  (14.31)  (14.45)  (8.394)  (8.940) 
HHI  2.055  2.042  -0.0154  0.0476 
  (2.005)  (2.010)  (0.996)  (1.125) 
Metro  1.507  1.645  2.084**  2.021* 
  (1.773)  (1.797)  (0.900)  (1.060) 
logIncome  -1.270  -1.572  -1.731  -1.593 
  (2.739)  (2.778)  (1.613)  (1.949) 
logPop  -0.001  -0.002  -0.193  -0.183 
  (0.261)  (0.263)  (0.130)  (0.146) 
Unemployment  -5.270  -6.728  2.102  1.793 
  (11.56)  (12.08)  (7.789)  (9.238) 
Young  -2.524  -3.098  4.734  4.802 
  (6.382)  (6.301)  (3.447)  (3.884) 
Homeownership  -0.483  -0.781  -2.999  -2.945 
  (3.447)  (3.534)  (2.453)  (2.494) 
1990s   0.020 -0.069   -0.047 -0.0207 
   (0.375) (0.411)   (0.169) (0.210) 
2000s   0.041 0.142   -0.194 -0.044 
   (0.392) (0.405)   (0.189) (0.268) 
Constant 0.173 10.37 0.154 14.36 -3.38*** 19.22 -3.33*** 17.52 
 (0.171) (32.17) (0.299) (32.51) (0.645) (19.34) (0.716) (24.10) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.007 0.045 0.007 0.048 0.893 0.914 0.895 0.914 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The link between the change in economic freedom and the change in social capital is also 
investigated, the results are not different the estimates of effects of the changes in economic 
freedom measures on the level of social capital, except the fact that homeownership has negative 
significant effects on social capital, and metro is not significant. This study finds that the change 
in economic freedom has positive significant effect on the change in social capital. Moreover, the 
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changes in areas of economic freedom, except takings and discriminatory taxation, affects 
positively on the change in social capital. Tables 16 to 19 report regression estimates of the 
effects of the changes in economic freedom and its three areas on the change in social capital 
respectively. The results suggest that the change in economic freedom measures – except takings 
and discriminatory taxation – increases both level of and change in social capital. 
Table 17: Change in Economic Freedom (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CEFSL 0.206 0.233 0.188 0.176 0.823*** 0.785** 0.804*** 0.716** 
 (0.234) (0.257) (0.234) (0.244) (0.295) (0.298) (0.292) (0.288) 
Educ  4.366  4.408  -4.485  -5.245 
  (4.916)  (5.222)  (5.791)  (6.291) 
Gini  -4.663  -6.505  -9.442  -9.695 
  (9.553)  (9.708)  (12.76)  (12.12) 
HHI  -1.162  -0.912  -1.068  -0.318 
  (1.437)  (1.393)  (1.902)  (1.989) 
Metro  -0.016  0.0310  1.527  1.287 
  (1.426)  (1.416)  (1.720)  (1.727) 
logIncome  -2.245  -2.192  -1.267  -0.139 
  (1.975)  (2.023)  (2.691)  (2.879) 
logPop  0.0385  0.102  -0.303  -0.183 
  (0.215)  (0.217)  (0.237)  (0.252) 
Unemployment  -3.151  -6.969  -0.410  -9.805 
  (7.367)  (7.969)  (12.32)  (13.96) 
Young  0.611  -0.300  5.382  3.562 
  (5.572)  (5.645)  (5.173)  (6.110) 
Homeownership  -3.997  -4.444  -7.327*  -7.754* 
  (3.272)  (3.302)  (4.083)  (4.107) 
1990s   -0.328 -0.437   -0.442 -0.608* 
   (0.256) (0.293)   (0.299) (0.346) 
2000s   -0.336 -0.235   -0.539* -0.498 
   (0.289) (0.307)   (0.284) (0.352) 
Constant 0.0982 28.44 0.313 28.60 0.812 26.11 1.138* 14.38 
 (0.112) (21.62) (0.196) (21.69) (0.493) (31.68) (0.664) (34.58) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.011 0.069 0.033 0.090 0.317 0.429 0.364 0.463 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 This study notices that magnitudes of the changes in economic freedom measures are 
larger on the change in social capital than on the level of social capital. Hence, this study implies 
that the changes in economic freedom have more impacts on the change in social capital than on 
the level of social capital, even though the changes in economic freedom measures (except 
takings and discriminatory taxation) have significant effects on both the forms of social capital. 
Table 18: Change in Size Government (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CSGSL 0.138 0.146 0.121 0.104 0.710*** 0.724*** 0.652** 0.632*** 
 (0.134) (0.159) (0.132) (0.153) (0.237) (0.225) (0.244) (0.235) 
Educ  4.497  4.487  -5.226  -5.839 
  (5.018)  (5.338)  (5.677)  (6.179) 
Gini  -5.561  -7.224  -11.10  -11.29 
  (9.654)  (9.890)  (12.37)  (12.19) 
HHI  -1.272  -0.988  -1.130  -0.514 
  (1.446)  (1.400)  (1.885)  (2.040) 
Metro  0.0676  0.105  1.582  1.425 
  (1.421)  (1.422)  (1.809)  (1.815) 
logIncome  -2.326  -2.259  -1.150  -0.270 
  (2.008)  (2.075)  (2.770)  (2.978) 
logPop  0.0319  0.0974  -0.302  -0.203 
  (0.215)  (0.217)  (0.224)  (0.243) 
Unemployment  -3.196  -6.980  0.621  -6.910 
  (7.367)  (7.983)  (11.81)  (13.93) 
Young  0.0681  -0.723  5.910  4.319 
  (5.627)  (5.689)  (5.192)  (6.029) 
Homeownership  -3.858  -4.367  -7.503*  -7.786* 
  (3.307)  (3.335)  (3.767)  (3.967) 
1990s   -0.323 -0.437   -0.381 -0.489 
   (0.257) (0.294)   (0.304) (0.360) 
2000s   -0.330 -0.229   -0.474 -0.400 
   (0.291) (0.311)   (0.289) (0.371) 
Constant 0.148 29.96 0.353* 29.83 0.977* 25.70 1.245* 16.47 
 (0.116) (22.09) (0.200) (22.47) (0.530) (32.16) (0.685) (35.57) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.012 0.068 0.033 0.089 0.327 0.451 0.362 0.472 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 As the values of coefficient of determination increase when control variables, and time- 
and state-fixed effects are included in the regressions, the summary results are based on the 
column 8 of the regression tables (all of the tables for summary results follow the same reason). 
All of the results suggest that omitted variable bias is inevitable when unobserved state- and 
time- fixed effects are not controlled, hence, it is important to control those fixed effects. 
Table 19: Change in Takings and Discriminatory Taxations (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CTDTSL 0.023 0.072 0.002 0.022 0.293 0.206 0.260 0.169 
 (0.188) (0.226) (0.186) (0.219) (0.238) (0.282) (0.224) (0.270) 
Educ  3.444  3.776  -5.989  -6.375 
  (4.738)  (5.031)  (6.019)  (6.476) 
Gini  -5.533  -7.529  -11.02  -11.68 
  (9.468)  (9.616)  (13.24)  (12.79) 
HHI  -1.035  -0.799  -0.962  -0.190 
  (1.404)  (1.367)  (2.006)  (2.037) 
Metro  0.147  0.198  2.018  1.787 
  (1.456)  (1.432)  (1.886)  (1.866) 
logIncome  -2.088  -2.104  -1.144  -0.108 
  (1.981)  (2.007)  (2.839)  (2.975) 
logPop  0.0496  0.116  -0.281  -0.153 
  (0.210)  (0.213)  (0.261)  (0.272) 
Unemployment  -2.316  -6.548  1.479  -9.878 
  (7.308)  (7.997)  (13.32)  (15.73) 
Young  0.760  -0.555  5.086  2.679 
  (5.923)  (5.990)  (5.867)  (6.912) 
Homeownership  -4.228  -4.619  -6.684  -7.413* 
  (3.295)  (3.339)  (4.268)  (4.361) 
1990s   -0.342 -0.470   -0.484 -0.706* 
   (0.255) (0.301)   (0.310) (0.365) 
2000s   -0.348 -0.255   -0.516* -0.518 
   (0.281) (0.312)   (0.291) (0.377) 
Constant 0.0966 27.00 0.319 28.03 0.936 24.61 1.250* 14.46 
 (0.114) (21.57) (0.192) (21.45) (0.563) (32.67) (0.709) (35.53) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.000 0.060 0.024 0.084 0.253 0.372 0.300 0.415 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Change in Labor Market Freedom (SL) and Change in Social Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS 
TF 
OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
CLMSL 0.185 0.206 0.200 0.206 0.762** 0.710* 0.883** 0.755** 
 (0.211) (0.238) (0.208) (0.223) (0.352) (0.369) (0.338) (0.340) 
Educ  4.683  4.866  -3.558  -4.648 
  (4.991)  (5.299)  (5.823)  (6.338) 
Gini  -4.680  -6.207  -11.37  -10.65 
  (9.769)  (9.946)  (12.73)  (11.68) 
HHI  -1.042  -0.788  -1.044  -0.0586 
  (1.401)  (1.369)  (1.856)  (1.885) 
Metro  0.0987  0.0602  1.769  1.265 
  (1.425)  (1.426)  (1.660)  (1.601) 
logIncome  -2.381  -2.284  -2.170  -0.529 
  (1.989)  (2.031)  (2.660)  (2.762) 
logPop  0.0504  0.118  -0.255  -0.105 
  (0.206)  (0.210)  (0.229)  (0.246) 
Unemployment  -2.711  -7.028  0.141  -10.63 
  (7.295)  (7.971)  (12.44)  (13.64) 
Young  -0.471  -1.250  3.319  1.662 
  (5.538)  (5.684)  (5.278)  (6.091) 
Homeownership  -3.985  -4.347  -7.350*  -7.692* 
  (3.231)  (3.279)  (4.114)  (4.132) 
1990s   -0.345 -0.473   -0.496* -0.70** 
   (0.258) (0.304)   (0.283) (0.331) 
2000s   -0.374 -0.284   -0.722** -0.669* 
   (0.294) (0.313)   (0.289) (0.360) 
Constant 0.0226 29.78 0.249 29.25 0.217 35.75 0.537 17.83 
 (0.131) (21.91) (0.205) (21.91) (0.582) (31.41) (0.737) (33.62) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.012 0.068 0.038 0.094 0.321 0.431 0.395 0.482 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 To summarize the results, the level of economic freedom does not have significant effect 
on social capital. However, the changes in subnational level economic freedom measures have 
positive impacts on social capital (both level and change) - suggesting that when state and local 
governments relax the policies that previously restrained market activities, individuals are 
encouraged to increase civil assets, such as social capital. Hence, state and local governments 
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should be aware that economic policies are required to be monitored as the changes in policies 
can have huge impacts on the societal changes. When economic policies are not beneficial to 
society, the governments need to take actions to review and change the policies. 
Table 21: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (SL) on Social Capital 
Panel A. Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Social Capital 
 (1) (2) 
 Level Change 
Economic Freedom Index (-)* (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (-) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (-)* 
 
Panel B. Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Social Capital 
 Level  Change 
Economic Freedom Index (+)** (+)** 
1.Size of Government (+)* (+)*** 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (+) (+) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+)*** (+)** 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 To compare the findings of this study and those of Berggren and Jordahl (2006), the link 
between economic freedom and social trust is examined. Table 21 reports the coefficient 
estimates of the effect of the level of economic freedom on the level of social trust. The results 
suggest that the level of economic freedom is significant and may have negative impact on the 
level of social trust when state-fixed effects along with (or without) additional control variables 
are controlled. It is still significant when both time- and state-fixed effects are added, but the 
significant level of economic freedom diminishes when additional control variables are included 
as suggested by the coefficient estimates of column 8. HHI, metro, income and population are 
significant when only state-fixed effects are controlled; however, these variables become 
insignificant when time dummies are included. Time dummies are significant in all of the 
regressions, and that suggests that social trust has declined in the U.S. over the past two decades 
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compared to the 1980s. Such findings confirm with Putnam’s claim – trust among people has 
declined over the past decades (Putnam 1995a, 1995b, and 2000). 
Table 22: Level of Economic Freedom (SL) and Level of Social Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS TF OLS TF OLS 
SF 
OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
EFSL -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.013 -0.03** -0.03** -0.02** -0.017 
 (0.018) (0.02) (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.0104) 
Educ  0.102  0.0158  0.220  -0.160 
  (0.379)  (0.387)  (0.347)  (0.334) 
Gini  -0.109  -0.0917  -0.777  -0.303 
  (0.967)  (0.907)  (0.766)  (0.563) 
HHI  0.004  0.089  -0.172*  0.016 
  (0.138)  (0.136)  (0.098)  (0.081) 
Metro  0.003  -0.035  0.136*  0.051 
  (0.099)  (0.102)  (0.068)  (0.063) 
logIncome  -0.092  -0.0189  -0.28**  -0.045 
  (0.183)  (0.176)  (0.131)  (0.132) 
logPop  0.001  0.0113  -0.02**  -0.004 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.01)  (0.011) 
Unemployment  0.595  0.103  1.182  0.278 
  (0.902)  (0.902)  (0.722)  (0.611) 
Young  -0.339  -0.347  -0.122  -0.0159 
  (0.505)  (0.498)  (0.298)  (0.297) 
Homeownership  0.0678  0.00120  0.0542  0.0375 
  (0.237)  (0.238)  (0.193)  (0.188) 
1990s   -0.06** -0.06**   -0.1*** -0.1*** 
   (0.0254) (0.027)   (0.010) (0.02) 
2000s   -0.1*** -0.1***   -0.1*** -0.1*** 
   (0.024) (0.03)   (0.012) (0.017) 
Constant 0.5*** 1.595 0.56*** 0.666 0.4*** 3.907** 0.41*** 0.985 
 (0.126) (2.136) (0.117) (2.007) (0.095) (1.591) (0.0818) (1.627) 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.022 0.050 0.108 0.128 0.812 0.860 0.912 0.916 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The similar results are observed when the level of social trust is regressed against the 
areas of economic freedom; the significances of the areas of economic freedom disappear when 
both state- and time- fixed effects along with the control variables are controlled. Tables of the 
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regression estimates for the effects of the level of areas of economic freedom on the level of 
social trust are not reported; instead, the summary of the results is provided in column 1 of panel 
A of table 23. 
Table 23: Level of Economic Freedom (SL) and Change in Social Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS 
TF 
OLS TF OLS SF OLS SF OLS 
TF&SF 
OLS 
TF&SF 
EFSL -0.009 -0.000 -0.008 0.002 -0.022 -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) 
Educ  -0.101  -0.020  -0.539  -0.465 
  (0.309)  (0.311)  (0.483)  (0.557) 
Gini  0.604  0.461  0.191  0.125 
  (0.522)  (0.549)  (0.823)  (0.92) 
HHI  0.120  0.120  0.196  0.177 
  (0.110)  (0.108)  (0.140)  (0.153) 
Metro  -0.045  -0.028  -0.016  -0.002 
  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.116)  (0.128) 
logIncome  -0.025  -0.073  -0.018  -0.05 
  (0.135)  (0.133)  (0.213)  (0.255) 
logPop  -0.005  -0.004  0.003  0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Unemployment  0.144  -0.081  1.108  1.114 
  (0.581)  (0.603)  (1.188)  (1.263) 
Young  0.016  -0.074  0.304  0.268 
  (0.341)  (0.342)  (0.455)  (0.503) 
Homeownership  -0.059  -0.136  0.016  -0.008 
  (0.225)  (0.226)  (0.336)  (0.338) 
1990s   -0.023 -0.017   -0.022 0.000 
   (0.016) (0.0175)   (0.020) (0.024) 
2000s   0.01 0.012   0.004 0.009 
   (0.018) (0.016)   (0.019) (0.023) 
Constant 0.029 0.029 0.024 0.653 0.161 -0.140 0.139 0.309 
 (0.077) (1.464) (0.079) (1.423) (0.129) (2.528) (0.125) (3.088) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.007 0.097 0.047 0.122 0.265 0.386 0.290 0.389 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The results in table 22 indicate that the level of economic freedom does not have 
significant effect on the change in social trust; none of the control variables are significant as 
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well. Moreover, the levels of the areas of economic freedom do not have significant effects on 
the change in social capital. The summary of these results is presented in column 2 of panel A of 
table 23. The effect of the changes in economic freedom measures on both the level of social 
trust and the change in social trust are also estimated; no significant link between the change in 
economic freedom and social trust (both level and change) is observed. The summary of the 
results is presented in panel B of table 23. 
 The findings of this study suggest that economic freedom has no significant effect on 
social trust and do not confirm with Berggren and Jordahl’s (2006) findings. One of the possible 
answer is the use of the different datasets – cross-countries data in Berggren and Jordahl (2006) 
and panel dataset of U.S. contiguous states in this study. An advantage of using panel dataset is 
that it enables this study to control unobserved time- and state- fixed effects. It is important to 
control time- and state- fixed state effects since social capital is a dynamic concept and its 
existence can be varied across different societies. 
Table 24: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (SL) on Social Trust 
Panel A. Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Social Trust 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (-) 
 
Panel B. Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Social Trust 
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom index (+) (-) 
1.Size of Government (+) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+) 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
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7.2. Effects of All Government Level Economic Freedom Measures  
 All government level economic freedom allows scholars to observe the impacts of federal 
government along with the impacts of state and local level governments on economic activities. 
All the same estimation methods used in investigating the effects of subnational level economic 
freedom measures on social capital and social trust are used. Surprisingly, there is no significant 
relationship between economic freedom (and its areas) and social capital, except the relationship 
between the change in labor market freedom and the change in social capital. This study 
observes the diminishing significances of the changes in economic freedom measures when 
different governmental level measures of economic freedom are applied but the signs of 
economic freedom measures do not change. This study implies that state level governments 
(including local levels) may have more impact on social affairs than the federal government. The 
summary results is reported in table 24. 
Table 25: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (AL) on Social Capital 
Panel A. Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Social Capital 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (-) 
2.Takings and discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (-) 
 
Panel B. Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Social Capital 
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (+) (+) 
1.Size of Government (+) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+)** 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 The results from the effect of economic freedom on social trust are not different from 
those of economic freedom on social capital. Hence, this study implies that economic freedom 
and its areas measured at all government level have no significant effect on social trust. The 
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results confirm the findings of the effects of subnational level economic freedom measures on 
social trust. This study implies that economic freedom is not influential on social trust among 
individuals. The findings do not confirm those of Berggren and Jordahl (2006). The summary of 
results the effect of economic freedom on social trust is reported in table 25. 
Table 26: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (AL) on Social Trust 
Panel A. Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Social Trust 
 Level Change 
Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (-) 
2.Takings and discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (-) 
 
Panel B. Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Social Trust 
 Level  Change 
Economic Freedom Index (+) (+) 
1.Size of Government (+) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (+) 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level of the 
variables.  
 
7.3. Economic Freedom and other Components of Social Capital 
 As the social capital index of this study is made up of four components, this study is able 
to examine effects of economic freedom on other components of social capital, besides social 
trust. This study finds that economic freedom (measured at both subnational level and all 
government level) has no significant effect on voter turnout; in addition, voter turnout is not 
significantly linked with the areas of economic freedom except the change in takings and 
discriminatory taxation. The results suggest that the change in takings and discriminatory 
taxation measured both at all government level and subnational level can impact negatively on 
the level of voter turnout. Hence, the change in government tax policies may affect people to 
participate in politic affairs. As an increase in taxation reduce additional income for people, they 
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would have to spend more of their time on generating income to compensate the fraction of 
income which is taxed, and that eventually lead them to disengage in political affairs. The 
summary results of effect of economic freedom on voter turnout are reported in tables 26 and 27. 
Table 27: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (SL) on Voter Turnout 
Panel A: Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Voter Turnout 
 (1) (2) 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (+) 
1.Size of Government (-) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+) 
 
Panel B: Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Voter Turnout  
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-)* (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (-) 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 28: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (AL) on Voter Turnout 
Panel A: Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Voter Turnout 
 (1) (2) 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+) 
 
Panel B: Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Voter Turnout  
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-)* (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-) (+) 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
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 The link between economic freedom and religious participation is explored. This study 
finds that there is no clear link between the levels of economic freedom measures at subnational 
level and religious participation while the changes in economic freedom measures, except 
takings and discriminatory taxation, have negative effects on the level of religious participation. 
No significant link between the changes in economic freedom measures, except labor market 
freedom, and the change in religious participation is observed. In addition, there is no significant 
link between economic freedom measured at all government level and religious participation. 
Summary results of the effect of economic freedom on religious participation is presented in 
tables 28 and 29. 
Table 29: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (SL) on Religious Participation 
Panel A: Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Religious Participation 
 (1) (2) 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (+) (+) 
1.Size of Government (+) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+) 
 
Panel B: Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Religious Participation 
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-)* (-) 
1.Size of Government (-)* (-) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (-) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-)** (-)** 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 To examine the link between economic freedom and informal socialization, a composite 
index for informal socialization is needed since there are four different types of socialization data 
are available from the General Social Survey (GSS). Hence, this study creates a composite index 
for informal socialization by using principal component analysis (PCA) method as the way the 
social capital index is developed in section 5. This study, however, is unable to investigate the 
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link between economic freedom and informal socialization since KMO value for appropriateness 
of the data for informal socialization is less than .50, and that indicates that socialization data is 
not appropriate to use PCA method. The findings suggest that economic freedom does not have 
strong significant impacts on the components (or aspects) of social capital such as voter turnout 
and religious participation. 
Table 30: Summary of Effects of Economic Freedom Measures (AL) on Religious Participation 
Panel A: Level of Economic Freedom Measures on Religious Participation  
 (1) (2) 
 Level Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (+) (+) 
1.Size of Government (+) (+) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (+) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (+) (+) 
 
Panel B: Change in Economic Freedom Measures on Religious Participation  
 Level  Change 
 Economic Freedom Index (-) (-) 
1.Size of Government (-) (-) 
2.Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (+) (-) 
3.Labor Market Freedom (-)** (-) 
+ & - indicate the signs of freedom Variables; ***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 Using the survey responses from the GSS, this study develops a composite social capital 
index spanning from the 1970s to the 2000s in U.S. contiguous states. The social capital 
developed in this study is able to capture both attitudinal aspects and non-attitudinal aspects of 
social capital. The developed social capital index enables this study to investigate the link 
between economic freedom and social capital in U.S. contiguous states from the 1980s to the 
2000s. This study observes that the levels of economic freedom measured at the subnational 
level does not have any significant effects on social capital while there is a positive significant 
link between the changes in economic freedom and social capital. Moreover, there is no 
significant effect of economic freedom measured at the all government level on social capital. 
The link between economic freedom measures and social trust is explored, and no significant 
link is observed. 
 One of the main objectives of this study is to compare the findings of this study and these 
of the previous studies. The results of the effects of all government level economic freedom on 
social capital in this study confirm the findings of Jackson et al. (2014) - suggesting that there is 
no significant link between economic freedom and social capital in the U.S. - while the results of 
the changes in economic freedom measures at subnational level contradict their findings. 
Comparing with the results of Berggren and Jordahl (2006), the findings of this study suggest 
that economic freedom measures (measured at both subnational level and all government level) 
have no impact on social trust - contradicting to the results of Berggren and Jordahl (2006). 
 One of the advantages of this study over Berggren and Jordahl (2006) is that this study is 
able to control variances over time and cross states. It is important to control unobserved state- 
and time- fixed effects since the existence of social capital can be varied overtime and depends 
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on the characteristics of societies. Another advantage of this study would be that there are less 
variances involved in this study since states-level data is used in this study compared to a cross-
country study in Berggren and Jordahl (2006). The advantage of this study over Jackson et al. 
(2014) is that the composite social capital measure of this study is able to include non-attitudinal 
aspects of social capital, informal socialization and social trust that are not included in their 
study. 
It is also important to note that there are several drawbacks in this study. First, the 
composite social capital index is not able to capture associational memberships, which is widely 
used as a social capital measure in previous social capital studies, for instance, Rupasingha et al. 
(2006), is an important aspect of social capital. Second, the panel dataset in this study is 
relatively short – this study has only three decades as time periods – as it is not possible to 
develop annual data for social capital by using the survey responses from the GSS. Hence, there 
are not a lot of observations in the dataset. Having more observations may produce more 
accurate estimates. Third, endogeneity between economic freedom and social capital, mentioned 
in Berggren and Jordahl (2006), is not handled in this study. Causal link between these two 
variables has not been explored yet, so endogeneity may arise in the relationship between 
economic freedom and social capital. To handle the endogeneity issue, valid instruments are 
required; but finding valid instruments to control endogeneity between economic freedom and 
social capital is not quite easy since theoretically the factors that affect economic freedom can 
also affect social capital as both of these variables are multi-dimensional concepts.  
Berggren and Jordahl (2006) use geographical factors such as latitude, and colonial 
heritage of a country such as colonial dummies – UK colony and Spanish colony - , fraction of a 
country’s population that speaks English as a native language and fraction of a country’s 
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population that speak European language such as English, French, German, Portuguese, or 
Spanish. It is important, however, to notice the difference between this study and the study of 
Berggren and Jordahl (2006). As this study uses a panel data of U.S. contiguous states, 
instruments used in cross-countries study of Berggren and Jordahl (2006) will not be valid since 
variances in culture and characteristics among U.S. states are less than countries across world. 
Moreover, as mentioned previously, history and characteristics of a society may affect not just 
social capital but also economic freedom. Therefore, using colonial origins of U.S. states may 
affect both economic freedom and social capital, and that may lead the use of colonial origins not 
to be valid. System Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM) dynamic estimation as 
used in Jackson et al. (2014) would be a solution to handle endogeneity, but this study would not 
able to apply this method because of the short-panel dataset.  
 Despite having drawbacks, this study contributes to the literature on economic freedom 
and social capital. The findings of this study suggests that state and local governments’ economic 
policies impact more on individuals’ decisions to engage in social activities than the federal 
government. When state and local governments make positive changes in economic freedom 
such as fewer regulations and fewer government spending, there will be an increase in social 
capital. However, it would not be a case when involvements of the federal government are 
accounted. A society might have both economic freedom and social capital but the existence of 
social capital may not be affected solely by economic freedom. Even though this study examines 
the effect of economic institution and policies on social capital, effects of other institutions or 
policies such as political institutions on social capital still remain to be asked. This study 
observes that economic freedom has no effect on voter turnout, and that suggests that political 
liberty matters more on individuals’ decisions to engage in political affairs than economic 
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freedom. In addition, civil liberty would be influential for religious participation than economic 
freedom. It is also important to note that other factors such as culture, history and characteristics 
of a society may affect more on social capital rather than economic freedom. 
This study concludes that societies would not be worse off by having both economic 
freedom and social capital since both can reduce transaction costs and facilitate production. Even 
though measuring social capital can be difficult because of existing data issues and various 
definitions of social capital, further research on measuring social capital and investigating 
possible links between institutions and social capital should not be ignored. Moreover, research 
on the causal links between institutions (including economic freedom) and social capital is also 
required in the literature of social capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 71 
REFERENCES 
Apergis, Nicholas; Oguzhan C Dincer and James E Payne. 2012. "Live Free or Bribe: On the
 Causal Dynamics between Economic Freedom and Corruption in Us States." European
 Journal of Political Economy, 28(2), 215-26. 
Apergis, Nicholas; Oguzhan Dincer and James E Payne. 2014. "Economic Freedom and Income
 Inequality Revisited: Evidence from a Panel Error Correction Model."Contemporary
 Economic Policy, 32(1), 67-75. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1999. “Observations on Social Capital,” in Dasgupta and Seragelin, eds. Op.
 cit.,pp.3-5 
Ashby, Nathan J and Russell S Sobel. 2008. "Income Inequality and Economic Freedom in the
 Us States." Public Choice, 134(3-4), 329-46. 
Belasen, Ariel R., and H.W. Hafer 2012. “Well-being and Economic Freedom: Evidence from
 the States”. Intelligence, May-June: 306–316 
Bennett, Daniel L and Richard K Vedder. 2013. "A Dynamic Analysis of Economic Freedom
 and Income Inequality in the 50 Us States: Empirical Evidence of a Parabolic
 Relationship." Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, 43(1), 42-55. 
Berggren, Niclas. 1999. "Economic Freedom and Equality: Friends or Foes?" Public Choice,
 100(3-4), 203-23. 
Berggren, Niclas and Henrik Jordahl. 2006. "Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and Social
 Capital." Kyklos, 59(2), 141-69. 
Bjørnskov, Christian. 2012. "How Does Social Trust Affect Economic Growth?" Southern
 Economic Journal, 78(4), 1346-68. 
 72 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. "Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the
 Sociology of Education. John G. Richardson, ed. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp.
 241-60. 
Brace, Paul, Kellie Sims-Butler, Kevin Arceneaux, and Martin Johnson. 2002. "Public Opinion 
 in the American States: New Perspectives Using National Survey Data." American 
 Journal of Political Science, 173-189. 
Burgess, Cara; Scott Beaulier and Joshua Hall. 2009. "Economic Freedom and Conflict: An
 Empirical Note." Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 10(3), 75. 
Carlsson, Fredrik and Susanna Lundström. 2002. "Economic Freedom and Growth:
 Decomposing the Effects." Public Choice, 112(3-4), 335-44. 
Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal
 of Sociology, 95-120. 
Compton, Ryan A; Daniel C Giedeman and Gary A Hoover. 2011. "Panel Evidence on
 Economic Freedom and Growth in the United States." European Journal of Political
 Economy, 27(3), 423-35. 
Dasgupta, Partha. 1999. “Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital,” in Dasgupta and
 Serageldin, eds. op. cit. pp. 325-424.  
Dawson, John W. 2003. "Causality in the Freedom–Growth Relationship." European Journal of
 Political Economy, 19(3), 479-95. 
____. 1998. "Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross‐Country and Panel Data
 Evidence." Economic Inquiry, 36(4), 603-19. 
De Haan, Jakob and Clemens LJ Siermann. 1998. "Further Evidence on the Relationship
 between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth." Public Choice, 95(3-4), 363-80. 
 73 
Doucouliagos, Chris and Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu. 2006. "Economic Freedom and Economic
 Growth: Does Specification Make a Difference?" European Journal of Political
 Economy, 22(1), 60-81. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development." Third World
 Quarterly, 22(1), 7-20.  
____. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free Press New York. 
Glaeser, Edward L; David Laibson and Bruce Sacerdote. 2002. "An Economic Approach to
 Social Capital*." The Economic Journal, 112(483), F437-F58. 
Guiso, Luigi; Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. 2000. "The Role of Social Capital in
 Financial Development," No. w7563. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gwartney, James; Robert Lawson and Walter Block. 1996. “Economic Freedom of the World
 1996 Annual Report,” Fraser Institute. Vancouver, BC. 
Gwartney, J. D., Lawson, R. A., & Holcombe, R. G. 1999. “Economic Freedom and the
 Environment for Economic Growth. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
 (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 643-663. 
Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson. 2003. "The Concept and Measurement of Economic
 Freedom." European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 405-30. 
Hall, Joshua, Boris Nikolaev, John Pulito, and Ben VanMetre 2013. “Freedom and
 Entrepreneurship: New Evidence from the States”. American Journal of
 Entrepreneurship, 6 (1): 85–99. 
Helliwell, John F and Robert D Putnam. 1995. "Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy."
 Eastern Economic Journal, 295-307. 
 74 
Jackson, Jeremy; Art Carden and Ryan A Compton. 2014. "Economic Freedom and Social
 Capital." Working Paper, 1-28. 
Karabegovic, Amela; Fred McMahon and Dexter Samida. 2002. "Economic Freedom of North
 America 2002 Annual Report." The Fraser Institute. Vancouver, BC. 
Karabegovic, Amela; Dexter Samida; Chris M Schlegel and Fred McMahon. 2003. "North
 American Economic Freedom: An Index of 10 Canadian Provinces and 50 US States."
 European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 431-52. 
Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer. 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
 Cross-Country Investigation." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1251-88. 
Knack, Stephen. 2002. "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the
 States." American Journal of Political Science, 772-85. 
Knack, Stephen and Paul J Zak. 2003. "Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust,
 and Economic Development." Supreme Court Economics Review, 10, 91. 
Kreft, Steven F and Russell S Sobel. 2005. "Public Policy, Entrepreneurship, and Economic
 Freedom." Cato Journal, 25, 595. 
McFadyen, M Ann and Albert A Cannella. 2004. "Social Capital and Knowledge Creation:
 Diminishing Returns of the Number and Strength of Exchange Relationships." Academy
 of Management Journal, 47(5), 735-46. 
Newton, Kenneth. 1997. "Social Capital and Democracy." American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5),
 575-86. 
North, Douglas C. 1991. "Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97-112. 
Paxton, Pamela. 1999. "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator
 Assessment 1." American Journal of Sociology, 105(1), 88-127.  
 75 
____. 2002. "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." American
 Sociological Review, 254-77. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1995a. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of
 Democracy, 6(1), 65-78. 
____. 1995b. "Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America."
 PS: Political science & politics, 28(04), 664-83. 
____. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon and
 Schuster. 
Rosenfeld, Richard; Eric P Baumer and Steven F Messner. 2001. "Social Capital and
 Homicide." Social Forces, 80(1), 283-310. 
Rupasingha, Anil; Stephan J Goetz and David Freshwater. 2006. "The Production of Social
 Capital in Us Counties." The Journal of Socio-Economics, 35(1), 83-101. 
Sachs, Jeffrey. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. Penguin, 2008. 
Scully, Gerald W. 2002. "Economic Freedom, Government Policy and the Trade-Off between
 Equity and Economic Growth." Public Choice, 113(1-2), 77-96. 
Sobel, Joel. 2002. "Can We Trust Social Capital?" Journal of Economic literature, 139-54. 
Solow, Robert M. 1999. “Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance,” in Dasgupta and
 Serageldin, eds. op. cit. pp. 6-10. 
Stansel, Dean and Fred McMahon. 2013. "Economic Freedom of North America 2013 Annual
 Report." The Fraser Institute. Vancouver, BC. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1999. “Formal and Informal Institutions,” in Dasgupta and Serageldin, eds.
 Op.cit. pp. 59-68. 
 76 
Uslaner, Eric M and Mitchell Brown. 2005. "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement."
 American Politics Research, 33(6), 868-94. 
Whiteley, Paul F. 2000. "Economic Growth and Social Capital." Political Studies, 48(3), 443-
 66. 
Woolcock, Michael. 1998. "Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical
 Synthesis and Policy Framework." Theory and Society, 27(2), 151-208.  
